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Better use has been made of association and this powerful instrument of action has been applied to more varied
aims in America than anywhere else in the world...
The most natural right of man, after that of acting on
his own, is that of combining his efforts with those of his
fellows and acting together. Therefore the right of association seems to me by nature almost as inalienable as individual liberty.
-Alexis

de Tocqueville'

Caught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism [the
isolated worker] can attainfreedom and dignity only by cooperation with others of his group.
-Senator

Robert F. Wagner2

[U]nder prevailing economic conditions. . . the individual unorganized worker [needs to] have full freedom of
association ....
-Section

2, Norris-LaGuardia Act 3

INTRODUCTION

Two recent cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "Act")" have focused attention on the role of the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") in the unorganized
workplace: Meyers Industries, Inc. ("Meyers P'),' which purports to
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 174-78 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966).
2 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2321 (1959) [hereinafter LEGISLA-

TIVE HISTORY].
3 Ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§ 102
(1982)).
4 Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1982)), amended by Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136, and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
5 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941

(D.C. Cir.) [Prill I], cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), on remand, 281 N.L.R.B.
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define the elements of employee concerted activity engaged in for "mutual aid or protection," 6 and E. L DuPont de Nemours & Co. ("DuPont II"P), which held that Weingarten" rights were not applicable in
the nonunion workplace. These cases directly affect the right of association in the employment relationship and present critical issues concerning basic organizational rights of workers under American labor law.
The ultimate disposition of these issues will influence the long term
course of industrial relations in this country.
Many people will be surprised that the actions of the NLRB have
any relevance for nonunion establishments, except when a union is attempting to organize. Indeed, to most participants in the employment
relations community, the NLRB might seem to have been relegated to a
decidedly secondary role in the employment law arena. According to
this conventional wisdom, the National Labor Relations Act has only
minor importance in the real world of industrial relations9 and most
current legal restraints on the workplace consist of a potpourri of federal statutory and state common law that protect individual employment rights, not collective rights. History, however, has a way of reminding us that conventional wisdom can be deceptive. This Article is
intended to challenge that conventional wisdom by examining the congressional intent, embodied in Section 7 of the Act more than a half
century ago, and by applying that intent to the interaction of employers
and employees in the disposition of their disputes in the nonunion
workplace. Many employers, perhaps most, and certainly most employees, are totally oblivious of the existence of this important body of law.
Yet despite such mass unawareness, the NLRA is the only law governing the relationship between an employer and its employees as a
No. 118 (Sept. 30, 1986) [Meyers II], enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [Prill II], cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2847 (1988).
6 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (Section 7 of the Act).
289 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (June 30, 1988). E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 274
N.L.R.B. 1104 (1985) [DuPont II], remanded back to the Board by the Third Circuit.
See Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). DuPont III is the Board's decision after the Third Circuit's remand. Companion cases include E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984); E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1983); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 262
N.L.R.B. 1028 (1982) [DuPont I].
8 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (holding that an employee
in a unionized workplace subjected to an investigatory interview about matters that
might reasonably lead to discipline is entitled to have a union representative present
during the interview); infra notes 260-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Weingarten rule).
9 For a discussion of the emergence of the current nonunion industrial relations
system, see T. KOCHAN, H. KATZ & R. MCKERSIE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 47-80 (1986).
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group in most private sector establishments in this country.'" Notwithstanding the recent lull in union organizational activity and the past
reluctance of the NLRB to provide vigorous enforcement of the core
provisions of the Act," the Board is currently very much alive and increasingly active-and potentially very active. Indeed, because so many
more nonunion, as compared to union, establishments exist today, the
Board's presence is more important to nonunion establishments and
their employees than ever before. 2 It is therefore not surprising that
the Board has recently issued a number of decisions concerning Section 8(a)(1)1" conduct involving the association of unorganized employees where there was no pertinent evidence of outside union activity.' 4
Six of those decisions, including Meyers I and DuPont III, pertain to real-life scenarios, centering on individual employees,' that
could easily have arisen in almost any company in the United States.
All of them occurred in nonunion establishments; none of them involved
an organizational campaign by an outside union. I chose to analyze
those fact situations, and to examine the manner in which the NLRB
has responded to them, in order to provide a glimpse at a general theory that should help define the concept of protected concerted action
under the Act. By "general theory" I mean a broadly applicable coherent set of propositions that will help to explain, with reasonable consistency and predictability, when and what employee conduct is protected
by Section 7, particularly the conduct embraced by the statutory phrase
10 The principal exceptions to such coverage are the railroad and airline industries, which are covered by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
"I See generally Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old Board
Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1987) (urging a non-legislative restructuring and a corresponding revitalization of the Board to achieve more effective enforcement of the Act).
12 The decline in unionization continued through last year. See Union Membership Falls to 16.8% in 1988, Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 18, Jan. 30, 1989,
(reporting that last year's decline in the percentage of unionized workplaces continued
a trend started four decades ago). Thirty five percent of non-agricultural workers in
1946 were union members. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, D. CULLEN & D. LEWIN, THE
LABOR SECTOR 124 (3d ed. 1980).
13 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
14 See, e.g., Hamilton Plastics, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Oct. 31, 1988); Owens Illinois, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Sept. 22, 1988); Whittaker Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. No.
116 (July 18, 1988); Oakes Machine Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (Apr. 14, 1988);
Quality Pallet Sys., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (Feb. 15, 1988); Glenwood Management Corp., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (Jan. 29, 1988); Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283
N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Apr. 21, 1987); Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (Apr. 19,
1987); Joseph De Rario, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Apr. 10, 1987); Millcraft Furniture
Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (Jan. 5, 1987); Every Woman's Place, Inc., N.L.R.B. No.
48 (Dec. 11, 1986); Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Nov. 13, 1986).

15 See infra notes 181-353.
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that guarantees employees the right "to engage in . . .concerted activities for the purpose of . . .mutual aid or protection."1 6

This Article provides only a glimpse at a general theory because
its scope covers only employee pre-organizational activity,1 although
the broad range of Section 7 rights also covers union organizational
activity, the collective bargaining process, and enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. But if this general theory is credible, it
should also be applicable to these other aspects of Section 7 activity and
the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement,18 although such
application must await further exposition at other times and other
places.
This study concentrates on the conduct typified by the six scenarios. The situations which they describe are so common that most employers and employees will readily empathize with their familiar fact
patterns. In addition, the scenarios provide ideal materials for testing
the application of the general theory: Each arose in a nonunion setting,
and each raises the question of whether the employee conduct constituted an exercise of a protected right to engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection. The first involves a truck driver fired for
reporting the unsafe condition of his truck to a state public service commission and for his refusal to drive that vehicle." The second involves
an employee fired for calling the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor on her own initiative but after several employees
had each complained about a holiday overtime matter.2 ° The third involves an employee fired for speaking up about a change in the lunch
hour policy that concerned her and several other employees.2" The
fourth involves an employee fired for discussing with another employee
the fact that she had been placed on probation. 2 The fifth involves an
employee transferred to a different shift and given a reduced work
week because she had spoken to other employees about the termination
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Pre-organization activity includes any mutual activity covered by Section 7
when no union is present. It does not necessarily contemplate a union organizational
drive. Cf.infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing case law that rejects the
contention that Section 7 pertains only to union or union related activity).
18 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 181-220 and accompanying text (discussing Meyers I and Meyers, Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Sept. 30, 1986) [Meyers II]).
20 See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text (discussing Every Woman's
Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (Dec. 11, 1986)).
21 See infra notes 225-36 and accompanying text (discussing Salisbury Hotel,
Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Apr. 21, 1987)).
2 See infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text (discussing Parke Care of Finneytown, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Dec. 16, 1987)).
18
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of a fellow employee. 23 The sixth involves an employee fired for refusing to meet with his manager unless he was allowed to have a coworker present during the interview; the purpose of the meeting was to
inquire into an incident for which the employee expected to be
disciplined.24
How many of these scenarios constitute protected concerted activity? All of the situations are cut from the same fabric, and they should,
but not necessarily must, yield the same answer. This Article seeks to
delineate the patterns in that fabric which might provide an explanation of why they should all yield the same answer. In my view, the
plain meaning of the language of Section 7 and the original congressional intent, coupled with the guidelines provided by mainstream judicial opinion, can yield a relatively simple formula that will make it
easier to distinguish conduct that is congressionally protected from conduct that is not. The theory will also make it easier to distinguish conduct the Board is required to protect from conduct it may protect. As to
the former distinction, the formula leaves no room for the exercise of
either administrative or judicial discretion. As to the latter, the formula
provides a guideline to assist the Board in choosing whether to treat
such conduct as protected or unprotected.
The six scenarios will be discussed following an examination of
pertinent statutory language, legislative history, and the manner in
which the Board and courts have treated the statutory provision. These
three areas provide the chief components of the general theory.
I. THE QUEST FOR STATUTORY MEANING
A.

The Statutory Language

The place to begin the search for meaning is in the language of
the provision itself. As enacted in 1935, Section 7 reads as follows:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
'25
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
2 See infra notes 245-58 and accompanying text (discussing Adelphi Inst., Inc.,
287 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (Jan. 19, 1988)).
24 See infra notes 288-353 and accompanying text (discussing DuPont 111).
25 Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (emphasis added). The phrase "and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)" was added
in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley amendments. See Labor-Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 7, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157
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Section 7 of the Act is a more definite expression of federal law
than that contained in Section 7(a)(1) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, from which it was derived.2 6 Unlike the NIRA provision,
Section 7 provides that employees shall have the right-notjust an abstract expression of freedom as had appeared in Section 7(a)(1)-to engage in the broadly phrased concerted activities. This is a feature of
Section 7 upon which the Board has not focused, certainly not the recent Board that framed the current version of the basic rule in the two
Meyers decisions. Rather, the Board and the courts have tended to look
to the activity in question to determine whether it is concerted in nature.2 7 The statute, however, does not merely protect activity in concert;
more broadly, it protects the right to engage in such activity. This concept provides one of the underlying premises upon which a complete
definition of protected concerted activity should be based.
I shall not parse the remainder of the language in Section 7, except to note that the "concerted activities" that the statute protects may
have any one or more of three distinct purposes: the purpose of collective bargaining, the purpose of mutual aid, or the purpose of protection
(which can also be read as "mutual protection"). All of those rights
may be added to, modified, or affected by the separate statement of
specific rights in the initial part of the paragraph, which spells out the
right to "self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
[and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." The broader "mutual aid or protection" language is particularly
important in defining conduct that precedes formal organizational activity, the conduct on which this Article concentrates.
Having stressed the clarity of the language of the provision, I want
to call attention to the commonly accepted meaning of two key words:
(1982)). This phrase is not pertinent to this discussion because it contemplates an expansion of rights, and thus would not constrain employees in their exercise of mutual
aid or protection.
2 See National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a)(1), 48 Stat. 195, 198
(1933), declared unconstitutional,A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935). The NIRA had required the adoption of industrial codes for the
purpose of regulating competition. Each code was intended to be binding on employers
within a particular industry, and Section 7(a)(1) required that every code provide:
That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the

interference, restraint,or coercion of employers or labor, or their agents,
in the designation of such representatives or in self organization or in
other concerted activitiesfor the purpose of collective bargaining or other

mutual aid or protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
2'7 See Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [Prill II], cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 2847 (1988).
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"concerted" and "mutual." Concerted derives its meaning from concert
and is generally synonymous with the phrase in concert. Those three
terms all convey a clear meaning. In reverse order, they mean "together; jointly;" "agreement of two or more individuals in a design or
plan; combined action; accord or harmony;" and "contrived or arranged
by agreement; planned or devised together; done or performed together
or in cooperation." ' The meaning of mutual is equally explicit: "possessed, experienced, performed, etc., by each of two or more with respect to the other; . . . held in common, shared .

.

. Mutual indi-

cates an exchange of a feeling, obligation, etc., between two or more
people, or an interchange of some kind between persons ...

.""

The

foregoing dictionary definitions will be useful to describe the kind of
employee activity illustrated by the cases, including the specified
scenarios.
Finally, when searching for meaning in the language of Section 7,
we should remind ourselves that the Supreme Court has indicated on
many occasions that in order to effectuate congressional intent, that section's provisions should be liberally construed. 30
B.

CongressionalIntent

While the language of Section 7, standing alone, is broad and relatively unambiguous in conveying its general mandate, its legislative
history also supports an expansive interpretation. As noted previously,
the language of the provision was derived from the National Industrial
Recovery Act; its key phrases, however, are even older."1
The first of the antecedent statutory provisions is Section 20 of the
Clayton Act of 1914, which sought to insulate "any person or persons,
whether [acting] singly or in concert" from federal injunctions against
28

THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

423 (Una-

bridged 2d ed. 1987).
29

Id. at 1270.

" See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (holding that Section 7 protects a broader range of activities than the "narrow[] purposes of 'self-organization' and 'collective bargaining' "); NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 2223 (1964) (disallowing a "good faith" defense to a Section 8(A)(1) charge; allowing
such a defense would have a "deterrent effect" on future concerted activity); see also
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (indicating the Board is
to foster employees' right "to organize for mutual aid without employer interference").
" For a detailed discussion of the history of Section 7 of the NLRA, see Gorman
& Finkin, The Individual and The Requirement of "Concert" Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286, 331-46 (1981). See also Lynd, The
Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition:A Study of Legislative
History, 50 IND. L.J. 720, 726-49 (1975) (carefully reviewing the legislative history
behind the language of Section 7).
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such economic labor weapons as strikes, boycotts, and picketing. 2 Although the Supreme Court in Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering 3
held this section to be merely "declaratory of the law" as it stood before
passage of the Act, 4 the provision provided a degree of congressional
legitimacy for American workers engaged in concerted activity.
After the Duplex decision, federal court injunctions continued to
frustrate organized labor's exercise of economic weapons,3 5 setting the
stage for passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.36 Congress intended that Act to block the use of federal injunctive power in labor
disputes by imposing jurisdictional and procedural limitations on the
federal district courts. Section 2 contained the key language of the declared "public policy of the United States":
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed
with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to
protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable
terms and conditions of employment, wherefore though he
should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is
necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents,
in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activitiesfor the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . .

..

Not surprisingly, in view of its largely borrowed origin, there is
little discussion or debate about specific language of Section 7 in the
formal legislative history. The brief references inserted in the legislative
record, however, are consistent and unambiguous regarding both the
statute's intent and derivation.
In his statements to the committee conducting hearings on the
32 See 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
3 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
34 Id. at 470.
35 See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act,

16 MINN. L. REv. 638, 638-39
(1932).
36 Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982)).
3- 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (emphasis added).
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House version of his bill, Senator Wagner said that the "language [of
Section 7] follows practically verbatim the familiar principles already
embedded in our law by section 2 of the Railway Labor Act of 1926,
section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, .
National Industrial Recovery Act . . ."s

. .

[and], section 7(a) of the
Earlier, the Senate Com-

mittee report accompanying the first draft of the bill had noted that
Section 7 rights restated earlier law. It then went on to discuss the idea
of "industrial democracy," which Senator Wagner viewed to be the end
product of his bill:
The language [of Sections 7 and 8(a)(1)] restrains employers
from attempting by interference or coercion to impair the exercise by employees of rights that are admitted everywhere to
be the basis of industrial no less than political democracy. A
worker in the field of industry, like a citizen in the field of
democracy, ought to be free to form or join organizations, to
designate representatives, and to engage in concerted
activities. 3 9
Senator Wagner explained that changes in the wording used in past
laws were made for the guidance of the courts and were not intended to
place any "limitations upon the broadest reasonable interpretation of
[Section 7's] omnibus guaranty of freedom ....2 o
The main objective behind Section 7 was also noted in the general
debates and other contemporaneous material concerning the entire statute, because Section 7 embodied the substantive content of all the original unfair labor practice protections. Its intent, therefore, was in essence the intent of the Act. Among his statements describing the
purpose of the bill, Senator Wagner outlined his vision of a cooperative
relationship between workers and employers and the requirements that
would be necessary to achieve that goal: "The primary requirement for
cooperation is that employers and employees should possess equality of
bargaining power. The only way to accomplish this is by securing for
employees the full right to act collectively through representatives of
-" Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935) [hereinafter Statement of Senator Wagner], reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 2487.
The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1982), begins: "The purposes of the
chapter are .. .(2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization .... ." Id.
19 S. REP. No. 1184, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934) (statement of Senator Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1103.
o Statement of Senator Wagner, supra note 38, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 2487.
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their own choosing." 4 1
This combined theme of equality and cooperation runs throughout
the legislative history. Wagner said that the bill "conforms to the democratic procedure that is followed in every business and in our govern' He saw
mental life." 42
the proposed statute as "the next step in the
logical unfolding of man's eternal quest for freedom." 4 Wagner
wanted the process of union organization to be especially protected, because he viewed the "isolated worker" as a "plaything of fate":
"Caught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed by the
size of corporate enterprise, he can attain freedom and dignity only by
cooperation with others of his group."""
Leon Keyserling, Wagner's Legislative Assistant, wrote Wagner's
speeches and was the principal draftsman of the statute and Senate Reports. Shortly before his death in 1987, Keyserling gave an extended
interview in which he discussed the drafting of the Wagner Act.4 5 He
confirmed that the Act was indeed intended "to place labor in a more
equal bargaining position."" He said that "it was our view that the
greatest contribution to greater equity and the distribution of the product between wages and profits would come, not through the definition
of terms by government, but by the process of collective bargaining with
labor placed in a position nearer to equality." 4 According to
Keyserling, "[o]ur approach was to make the worker a free man and
give him equality of bargaining power and let him make his contract if
he could."""
The purpose of the Wagner Act, and therefore the purpose of the
undisturbed language of Section 7, was to bring to the workplace a
legally protected right of association.4 9 This principle took the form of
statutory protection for the right of employees to organize themselves. It
was designed to allow employees to participate on equal terms with
41 78 CONG. REc. 3679 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 20.
42 79 CONG. REC. 2371 (1935) (statement of Senator Wagner), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1313.
41 Id. at 7565, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 2321.
44 Id.
45 See Casebeer, Holderof the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 285, 297 (1987).
46

Id. at 319.

47 Id.

48
41

Id. at 329.

See Summers, The Privatizationof PersonalFreedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 697 (stating that
"[n]ational labor policy, as articulated by Congress, was rooted in the first amendment
right of freedom of association; Congress acted to protect that right because the courts
had failed to do so").
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their employers in the determination of "rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment."5 Accordingly, Congress conceived protected concerted activity as a guarantee of the right
of workers to organize and express themselves freely, in a democratic
manner, concerning their wages and working conditions.
Senator Wagner recognized that for his concept of democracy in
the workplace to succeed, workers must be accorded the same right of
association vis-A-vis their employers as all Americans possessed vis-A-vis
their governments. That right of free expression is protected by the
Constitution 5 ' and is endemic to the American way of life. More than a
century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville described the importance
of associations in America:
Better use has been made of associations and this powerful
instrument of action has been applied to more varied aims in
America than anywhere else in the world.
Apart from permanent associations such as townships,
cities, and counties created by law, there are a quantity of
others whose existence and growth are solely due to the initi52
ative of individuals.
Regarding the quality of individualism, so often employed to describe the American ethic, de Tocqueville observed that the "inhabitant
of the United States learns from birth that he must rely on himself to
combat the ills and trials of life,"5" but he also stressed that individuals
succeeded in their endeavors because they readily associated with each
other to accomplish a myriad of tasks. According to de Tocqueville,
"[t]here is no end which the human will despairs of attaining by the
free action of the collective power of individuals. '54 He continued his
description of associations in America with the following high praise:
The right of associations being recognized, citizens can use it
in different ways. An association simply consists in the public and formal support of specific doctrines by a certain num50

This is the undisturbed language of the original Section 9(a). See 29 U.S.C.

§ 159(a) (1982).
" Protection of the right of association stems primarily from first amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assemblage, and petition. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-12 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v.
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-99 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976);
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-23 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
52 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 174.
53 Id.
54 Id.

at 174-75.
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ber of individuals who have undertaken to cooperate in a
stated way in order to make these doctrines prevail. An association unites the energies of divergent minds and vigorously
directs them toward a clearly indicated goal.
The most natural right of man, after that of acting on
his own, is that of combining his efforts with those of his
fellows and acting together. Therefore the right of association seems to me by nature almost as inalienable as individual liberty." 5
During the century that followed, as work in America shifted from
small employing units and self-employed workers to large scale industry and commerce with little self-employment, it was inevitable that the
need for associations in the workplace would be perceived as comparably important to the need for associations in public places. Such perception culminated in Senator Wagner's vision, a vision in which he saw a
means to transform the typically authoritarian employer-employee relationship into an equal partnership-at least regarding working conditions. The collective bargaining relationship was deemed to be naturally compatible with the democratic philosophy that is indigenous to
the American way of life.
Accordingly, it was the declared objective of the Wagner Act-an
objective deliberately left intact by the Taft-Hartley amendments 5 6-that the protected process of concerted activity in the workplace would be comparable to the rights of freedom of speech and association the first amendment guaranteed to workers' in their political
57
lives. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
drew that comparison in stating that an employer's rights of free speech
under the first amendment of the Constitution and Section 8(c)58 of the
Act "cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate
55

Id. at 175, 178.

5' Although the Taft-Hartley Act added new dimensions to the scope of the

NLRA, the underlying objective of the basic statute remained intact. Indeed, the statutory statement of policy retained and reaffirmed the primary purpose of the original
Act. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). During the Senate
debate preceding the vote to override President Truman's veto, Senator Taft emphasized that the bill "is based on the theory of the Wagner Act .... It is based on the
theory that the solution of the labor problem in the United States is free, collective
bargaining .... " 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1653 (1948); see Morris, supra note 11, at 11-17 (noting
that Taft-Hartley did not "change the core objective of the statute").
7 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
5' 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
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freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7."59 The right of association
is thus the hallmark of the design of American industrial relations. The
National Labor Relations Act is the blueprint of that design, and Section 7 is the cornerstone of the edifice that Congress intended to erect.
C.

The View from the Board and the Courts

It may appear to some that the Board and the courts have vacillated in their interpretation of the meaning of Section 7 concerted activity. Indeed, many Board and appeals court decisions lack consistency.
Nevertheless, a coherent policy does permeate Supreme Court and most
administrative and appellate decisions involving the unorganized workplace. Those cases have frequently failed, however, to reveal a clear
understanding of the scope and intent of the statutory provision. To
understand better the relationship of activity in the unorganized workplace--which I refer to as pre-organizational activity-the Supreme
Court's majority opinion in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.6 ° provides an introduction to the broad spectrum of Section 7 concerted activity. Although City Disposal directly addressed employee activity in
an organized workplace, Justice Brennan used the occasion to provide
an in-depth review of Section 7's scope and legislative intent. After examining the legislative history, the Court concluded:
[I]t is evident that, in enacting § 7 of the NLRA, Congress
sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the employee with that of his employer by allowing employees to
band together in confronting an employer regarding the
terms and conditions of their employment. There is no indication that Congress intended to limit this protection to situations in which an employee's activity and that of his fellow
employees combine with one another in any particular way.
Nor, more specifically, does it appear that Congress intended
to have this general protection withdrawn in situations in
which a single employee, acting alone, participates in an integral aspect of a collective process. Instead, what emerges
from the general background of § 7-and what is consistent
with the Act's statement of purpose-is a congressional intent to create an equality in bargainingpower between the
employee and the employer throughout the entire process of
labor organizing, collective bargaining,and enforcement of

80

G
Cissel
Packing, 395 U.S. at 617 (emphasis added).
465 U.S. 822 (1984).
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collective-bargainingagreements."1
Justice Brennan's analysis thus recognizes three distinct stages 2 or
"processes" in the organizational relationship between employees and
their employer. In each stage Congress intended the Act to provide an
equality of power between the parties. City Disposal defines the three
processes to which the standard of equality shall apply: (1) "the entire
process of labor organizing," (2) "the entire process of . . . collective
bargaining," and (3) "the entire process of . . . enforcement of collective bargaining agreements."
This Article divides the first process, labor organizing, into two
distinctive parts: the pre-organizational stage and the union organizational stage. As to the former, before any union contact exists, the nascent organizational process may simply consist of one or more employees attempting to interact or make common cause with one another
regarding a matter relevant to their working conditions. The process
may or may not come to the attention of the employer, and it may or
may not reach the stage of formal union organizational activity. Congress embraced such preliminary activity with the broadly protective
language of "concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or
protection" and guaranteed that employees would be protected in their
"right" to engage in such activities. The "right" has dearly not been
limited to organized workplaces.
Several key decisions have contributed to the shaping of the law in
the nonunion workplace. It is appropriate to begin our review with
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in NLRB v. Peter CaillerKohler Swiss
Chocolates Co.,63 which affirmed the Board's reinstatement of an employee who had been discharged for instigating the adoption of a resolution by employee members of an unaffiliated "union." The resolution
protested the employer's failure to support a dairy farmers' strike. It
was published in the local newspapers and was considered by the company to be gravely injurious to its business. The court conceded that the
striking farmers were not "employees" within the meaning of the Act,
hence mutual aid and protection could not apply to them. However, it
deemed the act of passing the resolution to be activity for the purpose of
mutual aid or protection among the employees in the unaffiliated union
at the employer's factory. The adoption of the resolution was, therefore,
Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
The term "stages" only emphasizes the distinctive levels of activity being described. Justice Brennan's use of the term "process" communicates more accurately the
dynamic nature of the affected conduct.
63 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
81
82

1688

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:1673

protected.64 Judge Hand's opinion contributed the following muchquoted dictum, which the Supreme Court in Weingarten quoted with
approval:
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause
with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go
out on strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity" for "mutual aid or protection," although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their
action each of them assures himself, in case his turn ever
comes, of the support of the one whom they are all then
helping; and the solidarity so established is "mutual aid" in
the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.6 5
NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.66 put to rest any
lingering notion that Section 7 was intended to cover only activity related to a labor dispute, a labor union, or a labor organization.6 7 The
employer had discharged two insurance salesmen because of their participation in informal meetings, their discussions about the filling of the
position of a cashier, and their activity in drafting a letter to management on behalf of the salesmen. The Board found that the salesmen's
commission earnings were affected by the cashier's performance. Hence
a direct connection existed between the cashier and the salesmen's
working conditions. Davis had been selected by his fellow salesmen to
draft a letter recommending the present assistant cashier for the cashier's position. Davis, with the assistance of Johnson and a third employee, prepared a tentative draft of the letter, but before it could be
completed and presented, the third employee was questioned about the
letter and advised not to sign it. Davis and Johnson were then terminated. Agreeing that "the moderate conduct of Davis and Johnson and
the others bore a reasonable relation to conditions of their employment," the court concluded that by incorporating the "mutual aid or
protection" language of the provision:
Congress must have intended to include within the act what
the usual meaning of these unambiguous words conveys. A
See id. at 505-06.
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261 (1975) (quoting Peter Caillier, 130 F.2d at 505-06).
66 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948).
67 See id. at 988 (stating that "[a] proper construction [of Section 7] is that employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or
protection even though no union activity be involved, or collective bargaining be
contemplated").
6

65
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proper construction is that the employees shall have the right
to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved, or collective bargaining be contemplated."8
In examining the cases that have interpreted and applied the right
to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, it is important to distinguish between three dimensions of Section 7 organizational activity: concertedness, object, and the conduct, i.e., the nature of
the activity itself. It is usually not difficult to determine when an activity is "concerted," notwithstanding the Board's confusion in Meyers I
and DuPont 111,69 nor is it very difficult to determine whether the activity is for "mutual" aid or protection. It is often a puzzling task, however, to determine whether the nature of the activity is protected and
whether the type of object for which the employees engage in the activity deprives them of the Act's protection.
In a given case, each dimension must be separately evaluated and
balanced against the other dimensions in order to arrive at a decision
that is consistent with a rational theory of protected concerted activity.
Implicit in this process is the realization that the same conduct may be
protected for some objectives, but not for others. Similarly, the same
objective may be deemed protected or unprotected, depending on the
means used to achieve it. The courts and the NLRB have never read
Section 7 so literally as to apply its protection to all concerted activity
regardless of purpose, time, place, or means. Certain types of concerted
activity engaged in by groups of workers, whether for the purpose of
collective bargaining or for mutual aid or protection, may be unprotected. 0 For example, conduct that is unlawful,7 ' in breach of contract,72' disloyal to the employer, 73 or undermines the authority of the
68 Id. NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945), underscored the point
that the statute was passed as "a grant of rights to the employees rather than as a grant
of power to the union." Id. at 774. Consequently, the discharge of an employee, whom
a supervisor had mistakenly thought to have been circulating a petition to present to the
company for the allowance of additional overtime work, was deemed to interfere with
Section 7 rights, notwithstanding the fact that the employee had actually been passing
out union cards. See id. The case also demonstrated an example of concerted employee
conduct of a relatively mild, non-coercive nature.
"9 See infra notes 180-220 & 288-353 and accompanying text.
70 See 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 159-64 (2d ed. 1983); id.
Supp. IV at 69-72; Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J.
319, 325 (1951); Gregory, Unprotected Activity and The NLRA, 39 VA. L. REV. 421,
436 (1953).
71 See, e.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 39-40 (1942) (violation of
mutiny statutes by seamen); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240,
248-49 (1939) (workers seized company buildings in sit-down strike).
72 See, e.g., NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 336-39 (1939) (union
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majority representative,"' is outside the protected coverage of the Act.
Such conduct is not within the main scope of this Article, but various
examples of unprotected conduct (based both on the object and on the
nature of the conduct) will be used to construct and describe a general
theory.
I will first address those cases that focus on the determination of
"concertedness." This factor is of particular importance to the unorganized workplace. 5 The Sixth Circuit's decision in NLRB v. GuernseyMuskigum Electric Co-op, Inc.,7 1 illustrated and confirmed that employees may act in concert with little or no conscious direction or leadership and with a total lack of formality. The case involved employee
dissatisfaction with the quality of their supervision. Dick Boyer was
one of several employees who had complained among themselves, and
then to management, about the selection of an inexperienced foreman
and about the need for a pay raise and sick leave. According to the
court, the purpose of their complaints was to have the foreman removed
and reclassified as a laborer. The court found ample evidence to support the Board's finding that Boyer had been discharged because of his
activity in connection with the position of the foreman. In approving
the finding of protected activity, the court provided the following useful
description of the concerted conduct:
The mere fact that the men did not formally choose a
breached departmental seniority provision of collective bargaining agreement).
73 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers [Jefferson Standard
Broadcasting Co.], 346 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1953) (holding that an employee's attack
upon the quality of the employer's product was just cause for dismissal because attack
was on "the very interests which the attackers were being paid to conserve and develop" and that therefore attacked was deemed disloyal); Patterson-Sargent Paint Co.,
115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1628 (1956) (upholding the dismissal of striking employees who
distributed handbills to the public that "impugn[ed] the quality and visibility of...
[the employer's] product").
74 See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50, 60-70 (1975) (finding unprotected the conduct of minority employees who
picketed despite an unresolved grievance presented by the majority representative).
75 In the organized workplace, assertion of rights under a collective bargaining
agreement will ordinarily be governed by a grievance procedure and arbitration, but the
assertion itself will also be protected under Section 7. This is the Board's Interboro
doctrine. See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (finding the discharge unlawful because the employee complaints constituted protective activity, for
they were "made in the attempt to enforce the provisions of the existing collectivebargaining agreement"), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1966). The City Disposal
Court expressly affirmed the Interboro doctrine, stating: "[Tihe assertion of a right
contained in a collective-bargaining agreement is an extension of the concerted action
that produced the agreement; and . . . the assertion of such a right affects the rights of
all employees covered by the collective-bargaining agreement." City Disposal, 465 U.S.
at 829; see Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962).
76 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
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spokesman or that they did not go together to see Mr. Scott
[one of the company's trustees] does not negative concert of
action. It is sufficient to constitute concert of action if from
all of the facts and circumstances in the case a reasonable
inference can be drawn that the men involved considered
that they had a grievance and decided, among themselves,
that they would take it up with management. 7
An employee acting alone may also be engaged in protected conduct when her activity sufficiently relates to concerted matters. The
case that firmly articulated the proposition that a single employee's discussion with other employees can constitute protected concerted activity
was Root-Carlin, Inc."' In that case, the Board held, in an oft-quoted
commentary, that "the guarantees of Section 7 of the Act extend to
concerted activity which in its inception involves only a speaker and a
listener, for such activity is an indispensable preliminary step to employee self-organization.

'79

Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB8" also involved activity
of a single employee. The Third Circuit's analysis in that case of the
requisite conduct for protection under the umbrella of "mutual aid or
protection" has had a far-reaching influence on the view of the Board
and courts as to the meaning of that key statutory phrase-a view
which has been unnecessarily restrictive. Although the case arose in a
unionized setting, the union's presence is not significant to the decision.
Charles Keeler, a non-regular employee of a trucking company, drove
as an "extra" pursuant to an "extra list" maintained by the union. He
was in the habit of talking to other employees and advising them of
their rights. The company heard rumors that he was telling other drivers that they were not getting what they were entitled to under the
union contract. The Board found Keeler's activity within the ambit of
protected concerted conduct under Section 7. The Third Circuit disagreed. It "look[ed] in vain" for evidence of any effort by Keeler to
initiate or promote any concerted action, and could find none."1
Whether the court looked hard enough is now academic, because
Mushroom Transportation'ssignificance is not based on the facts of
7 Id. at 12
I8 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951).
79 Id. at 1314. The activity in question was a discussion in which the employee
urged fellow employees to form a union and referred to a specific union. Although the
Board found his discharge for such activity to be in violation of Section 8(a)(3), it
separately and expressly found that the conduct was protected by Section 7. Therefore,
the discharge was also an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1).
80 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
81 See id. at 684.
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the case but rather on the court's analysis of the components of concerted activity. Therefore, the court's formulation deserves full and verbatim reproduction:
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute
a concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and
a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very
least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or
inducing or preparingfor group action or that it had some
relation to group action in the interest of the employees.
This is not to say that preliminary discussions are disqualified as concerted activities merely because they have not resulted in organized action or in positive steps toward
presenting demands. We recognize the validity of the argument that, inasmuch as almost any concerted activity for mutual aid and protection has to start with some kind of communication between individuals, it would come very near to
nullifying the rights of organization and collective bargaining
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act if such communications
are denied protection because of lack of fruition. However,
that argument loses much of its force when it appears from
the conversations themselves that no group action of any
kind is intended, contemplated, or even referred to.
Activity which consists of mere talk must, in order to be
protected, be talk looking toward group action. If its only
purpose is to advise an individual as to what he could or
should do without involving fellow workers or union representation to protect or improve his own status or working
position, it is an individual, not a concerted, activity, and if it
looks forward to no action at all, it is more than likely to be
mere "griping."82

The italicized part of the Mushroom Transportation analysis,
usually the only part quoted, is relatively innocuous, for the phrases
"preparing for group action" and "relation to group action in the interest of the employees" is sufficiently broad and vague to cover most situations that were intended to be covered by Congress.83 The remainder
of the statement, however, wholly misses the thrust of the statutory in82 Id. at 685 (emphasis added); cf. NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d
838, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1953) (reversing the Board and agreeing with the trial examiner
that the employee had been discharged because of her complaints and uncooperative
attitude, not for her union activity, of which the employer had no knowledge).
83 See Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685.
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tent. And like the Mushroom Transportationopinion, and often in reliance on it, the Board and some of the courts have focused on a search
for actual concertedness rather than on the existence of the right to
engage in concertedness.8 4 As the Supreme Court recognized in Washington Aluminum, however, unorganized employees should not be expected to act with keen and experienced perception in their efforts to
express themselves concertedly; they must act "as best they [can]." 85
Thus, if employees are to have a meaningful right to engage in concerted activity, they must be protected in any of their group conversations that relate to conditions of employment, absent some overriding
legitimate employer interest requiring a limit to such conversation. The
limit, however, should be based on such factors as time, place, and interference with productive work, and not on the Board's determination-often highly subjective-of whether the conversation in question
has reached the advanced stage of looking toward group action. A sufficient basis for the statutory requirement of concerted activity, or, more
accurately, the requirement of the right to engage in such activity,
should exist if the discussion's subject matter reasonably relates to
working conditions and two or more employees are involved in the
discussion.
Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB88 makes a positive contribution to the
process of distinguishing between individual and concerted activity in a
nonunion establishment. Employees Cobado and Swift had often registered their complaints to each other and to management about what
they perceived to be an unfair distribution of burdensome work on
machetes between the day and night shifts. Finally they told their supervisor that they were going to refuse to work on machetes the next
time it was their turn. The supervisor told them that if they did not like
the type of work required, they should leave and the employer would
find others to replace them.8" According to Cobado, the supervisor
looked at her and said, "If there is a thing on there [the day foreman's
list] that says you have to kiss my ass, that is what you are going to
do," to which Cobado responded, "I don't need this garbage." 88 She
then "walked to her machine, shut it down, packed her belongings, and
walked off the job, punching out and crying as she left."8 9 The next
84 But see infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Friendly's
opinion in Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980)).
85 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962); see infra notes
103-06.
8 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980).
87 See id. at 841-42.
88 Id. at 842.
89 Id.
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day Cobado telephoned her boss, apologized for having walked off the
job, and begged for her job back. The Company's response was to terminate her.9"
Judge Friendly's well-reasoned analysis opened with a reminder
that in construing Section 7, "courts should adhere rather closely to the
statutory text.""' His opinion recognized that prior to Cobado's walking off the job, she and Swift had indeed been engaged in concerted
activity, "meeting the 'mutual aid or protection' requirement of § 7."92
Their complaints to each other and to management represented a classic example of two employees who were acting together or jointly. Here
was an "agreement of two or more individuals" attempting to act "in
cooperation." 9 But Judge Friendly noted that the concertedness
stopped short of a concerted walkout, which would have been protected.
He observed that "[n]ot only must the ultimate objective [of the action]
be 'mutual' but the activity must be 'concerted' or, if taken by an individual . . .must be looking toward group action." 4 Accordingly, the

court reversed the Board because it "did not and could not reasonably
find that Cobado was discharged for making the protest in which Swift
joined; she was discharged and refused reinstatement because she
walked off her job. . . .Swift [however] went on with her work."' 95 In
other words, a one-person walkout cannot be a strike. This result may
seem harsh for employee Cobado, but the message of the case is fully
consistent with the statutory intent to encourage employees to act together for their mutual aid and protection. The NLRA was designed to
protect group or collective rights, not individual rights.
Another feature of Ontario Knife is worth noting. In the process
of analyzing the reach of Section 7, Judge Friendly recognized the
"right" involved and used that concept to explain why the one-person
action described as protected in the Mushroom Transportation formulation was entitled to such deference. 96 He said:
While by definition, an individual acting alone cannot act in
concert, § 7 is not limited to concerted activity per se. Instead, it protects the 'right to engage in

. .

.concerted activi-

ties.' If workers have the right to engage in concerted activities and to associate freely, then . . . employers cannot
90 See id.
91 Id. at 843.
92 Id. at 844.
93 See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
" Ontario Knife, 637 F.2d at 845.
95 Id.
96 This concept also appears as a component of the general theory formulation
described below. See infra notes 173-213 and accompanying text.
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obstruct an employee's efforts to exercise those rights."7
The nature and the object of the concerted activity are closely
linked in the case law. The courts and the Board often commit a fundamental error in balancing these factors. For instance, Joanna Cotton
Mills v. NLRB9 s involved the discharge of an employee for having circulated a petition asking for the discharge of a supervisor. After concluding that the object of the employee's activity was unrelated to collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the Board. The court found the conduct to be a "mere carrying
forward of the defiant attitude of a recalcitrant employee whose manifest object was to defy proper discipline . . ..." In the court's view,
the employee had a defiant and insulting attitude; therefore, his circulation of the petition "was conduct calling for discharge if any order or
discipline in the plant was to be maintained."1 0
In my view, the court overreacted to what it perceived to be an
"unwarranted interference with management."' 0 ' Although the employer would have been free to discharge the employee for his defiant
and insulting attitude, his circulation of a petition, which was concerted
conduct of a moderate nature that bore a reasonable relation to employee working conditions, should have been deemed protected. Therefore, the court erred in its construction of the statute.0 2
In 1962 the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co.' 0 3 addressed the issue of protected concerted activity by unorganized employees. The case involved a work stoppage rather than one of
the milder forms of concerted activity typified by the court of appeals
97 Ontario Knife, 637 F.2d at 844-45 (citation omitted).
98 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949).
9 Id.

100 Id.

at 753.

101 Id. at 754.

'0' G & W Electric Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1966), is a
similar failure to weigh the object of the concerted activity against the moderate nature
of the conduct. The Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of a Board order finding a
Section 8(a)(1) violation in an employer's discharge of an employee for distributing a
circular addressed to fellow employees. The circular sought support for the employee's
complaints concerning the manner in which the credit union was being operated. The
court found that the subject matter of the circular (the object of the concerted activity)
was not sufficiently related to conditions of employment to warrant protection. It did
not call for any action by the company, and the company had no control over the
matter in issue. The court therefore found the employee's conduct outside "the ambit"
of Section 7 protection. See id. at 875-77. Considering the moderate nature of the activity and the presence of an obvious, albeit weak, connection between the company and
the credit union, the court should have upheld the Board's finding that the conduct was
protected. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978)).
103 370 U.S. 9 (192).
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decisions noted above. The Court's opinion set the tone for measuring
protected concerted activity among nonunion workers, a tone that made
allowances for the employees' lack of sophistication and organizational
experience. Seven workers had walked out of an extremely cold factory
after their complaints had been ignored by the company. Despite the
fact that they had violated a plant rule prohibiting employees from
leaving work without permission, the Court upheld a Board finding
that their activity was protected concerted conduct. In rejecting the appeals court rationale that the activity was unprotected because the employer had not been given an opportunity to respond, the Court noted
that requiring the employees to provide advance notification "might
place burdens upon employees so great that it would effectively nullify
the right to engage in concerted activities." ' 4 The Court recognized
that the employees "were wholly unorganized [and that] they had to
speak for themselves as best they could.' 1

0

5

The Court stated:

We cannot agree that employees necessarily lose their right
to engage in concerted activities under § 7 merely because
they do not present a specific demand upon their employer to
remedy a condition they find objectionable. The language of
§ 7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities whether
they take place before, after, or at the same time such a demand is made. To compel the Board to interpret and apply
that language in the restricted fashion suggested by the respondent here would only tend to frustrate the policy of the
Act to protect the right of workers to act together to better
their working conditions."'0
The extent of the range of object or purpose for which concerted
activity may be protected under the rubric of "mutual aid or protec07
tion" was treated by the Supreme Court in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB.

At issue was the employer's efforts to prevent distribution of a union
newsletter on company property during nonworking time. The letter
included material critical of a presidential veto of an increase in the
minimum wage, and it also urged employees to oppose inclusion of a
right-to-work provision in the state constitution.'
In approving the
Board's finding of protected activity, the Court indicated that Congress
intended a broad area of protection by the phrase "mutual aid or pro104

Id. at 14.

105 Id.

Id.
437 U.S. 556 (1978). Although Eastex involved a unionized establishment, the
presence of a union was not a distinguishing feature.
108 See id. at 559-61.
106
107
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tection." It found "no warrant for [the] view that employees lose their
protection
when they seek to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels
outside the immediate employee-employer relationship."10 9 Furthermore, it held that the reach of Section 7 encompassed concerted activity
of employees "in support of employees of employers other than their
'
own."11
The Court said,
It is true

. . .

that some concerted activity bears a less

immediate relationship to employees' interests as employees
than other such activity. We may assume that at some point
the relationship becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the "mutual aid or protection" clause. It is neither necessary nor appropriate, however

. . .

to attempt to delineate precisely the boundaries of

[that] clause.1 '
The Court also clarified that the forms that such concerted activity
may permissibly take "may well depend on the object of the activity.' 1 12 It quoted approvingly Professor Getman's suggestion of an ap-

propriate relationship between an employer's ability to affect the object
of the activity and the nature of the activity: "'The argument that the
employer's lack of interest or control affords a legitimate basis for holding that a subject does not come within "mutual aid or protection" is
unconvincing. The argument that economic pressure should be unprotected in such cases is more convincing.'

"113

The final area of this case study concerns the legal justifications an
employer may interpose to prevent or penalize the exercise of otherwise
protected concerted conduct. Two cases, Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB" 4 and Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 115 provide the basic
parameters.
In Republic Aviation, the Supreme Court approved the Board's
finding that an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a
broad no-solicitation rule prohibiting employees from exercising their
Section 7 rights of association on company property during non-work109 Id. at 565. Among the examples provided by the Court were "resort to administrative and judicial forums [and] appeals to legislators to protect their interests as
employees." Id. at 566.
110 Id. at 564.
"I" Id. at 567-68.
112 Id. at 568 n.18 (emphasis added).
"I Id. (quoting Getman, The Protectionof Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1221 (1967)).
114 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
110 532 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1976), enforcing 217 N.L.R.B. 653 (1975).
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ing time. Noting that the "right of employees to organize for mutual
aid without employer interference [is] the principle of labor relations
which the Board is to foster," the Court emphasized that "[a]n essential
part of [the] system is the provision for the prevention of unfair labor
practices by the employer which might interfere with the guaranteed
rights." ' The case posed the question of how to make "an adjustment
between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to employees
under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers
to maintain discipline in their establishments."' 7 The Court's opinion
stressed that the "[o]pportunity to organize and proper discipline are
both essential elements in a balanced society." '
It approved the
Board's accommodation of those competing interests, as expressed in
Peyton Packing Co.:19
The Act . . . does not prevent an employer from making

and enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company time. Working time is for work. It is
therefore within the province of an employer to promulgate
and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during
working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid in
the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose. It is no less true that time outside working
hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or
rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on
company property. It is therefore not within the province of
an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting
union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours,
although on company property. Such a rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatoryin the absence of evidence
that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order
to maintain production or discipline.'
In Jeannette Corp. the Third Circuit reiterated that
[i]n weighing the justifications offered by the employer, we
1"6 Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798-99. It is noteworthy that Section 10 of the
Act is entitled "Prevention of Unfair Labor Practices." 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
1I Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 797-98.
118 Id. at 798.
119 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943).
120 Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (emphasis added) (quoting Peyton
Packing, 49 N.L.R.B. at 843-44).
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must heed the Supreme Court's admonition that "[i]t is the
primary responsibility of the Board and not of the courts 'to
strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in light of the
Act and its policy.' "121
Jeannette involved the termination of an employee who, in violation of a company rule prohibiting wage discussions among employees,
had engaged in conversations about wages with two other employees.
The Board found the rule and the termination unlawful under Section 8(a)(1) because such discussions were deemed an integral part of
organizational activity. 22 Affirming that conclusion, the Third Circuit
observed that it was "obvious that higher wages are a frequent objective
of organizational activity, and discussions about wages are necessary to
further that goal."' 23 Accordingly,
[a] rule barring wage discussions among employees without
any limitation as to time or place would presumably forbid
employee discussions on breaks, in waiting time, before and
after hours of work, during luncheons, and in restrooms.
Such an unqualified rule would deny freedom of discussion
among employees at times and places when such activity
could not adversely affect job performance.' 2 4
The court found appropriate for Section 8(a)(1) application the standard and order of proof that the Supreme Court had prescribed for
Section 8(a)(3) in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.: "Once the
Board makes out a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of
section 8(a)(3), 'the burden is upon the employer to establish that he
was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most
accessible to him.' "125 As to the employer's rule in Jeannette, the court
confirmed that "[t]he possibility that ordinary speech and discussion
over wages on an employee's own time may cause 'jealousies and strife
among employees' is not a justifiable business reason to inhibit the opportunity for an employee to exercise section 7 rights."' 2
Needless to say, the development of the law defining concerted ac21 Jeannette Corp., 532 F.2d at 918 (citing NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389
U.S. 375, 378 (1967) (quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33-34
(1967))).
122 See Jeannette Corp., 217 N.L.R.B. 653, 656 (1975).
123 Jeannette Corp., 532 F.2d at 918.
124

Id. at 919.

125

Id. at 919 n.4 (quoting Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. at 34 (emphasis

added)).
128

Id. at 919.
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tivity under Section 7 is reflected in hundreds of cases, but the cases
reviewed above will serve to highlight the important milestones in that
development.

12 7

II.

A

GLIMPSE AT A GENERAL THEORY

The general theory outlined in this section splits the concept of
Section 7 concerted activity into its logical components in an attempt to
offer a rational view of the diverse elements that make up the statutory
scheme. The theory is not a simplistic formula designed to provide instant answers to complex problems. By thus clarifying the process,
however, the Board and courts will have an analytical framework
through which to apply the congressional intent implicit in the statutory language. This formulation should be suitable for evaluating both
broad and specific fact situations, whether in the context of fact-oriented adjudications or rule-making proceedings. As to the latter, the
formulation should be equally useful whether the rule is promulgated
through notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act 12 or though the Board's more familiar process of adjudication in individual cases.129
The conduct in the six scenarios on which this Article concentrates
concerns activity in which the primary issue is concertedness, or in the
alternative, activity which is sufficiently related to concertedness to
merit statutory protection. Because this Article examines only the ini"I I have omitted from the above discussion the two lead cases contained in the

scenarios in this Article-Meyers I and DuPont III-as well as the cases that they
overruled or replaced, Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975), and Materials
Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982), respectively, inasmuch as those cases are
treated in detail below.
128 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
129 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (recognizing
that "the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative
proceeding and . . . the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first
instance within the Board's discretion"); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203
(1947) [Chenery I] (finding that "[t]here is . . . a very definite place for the case-bycase evolution of statutory standards"). The literature on this point is extensive. See,
e.g., Morris, supra note 11, at 27-42 (advancing eleven reasons the Board should favor
the use of substantive rulemaking); Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice
Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149 (1986) (analyzing the
potential for a broad movement away from rulemaking toward adjudication); Bernstein,
The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970) (arguing that administrative agencies possessing
both rulemaking and adjudicatory authority should make greater use of their rulemaking powers). The Board has recently shown greater receptivity toward APA rulemaking. On April 20, 1989, it issued a final rule, 29 C.F.R. Part 103 (1989), providing for
appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. See Daily Labor Report
(BNA) No. 76, Apr. 21, 1989.
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tial aspect of the first process that Justice Brennan defined in City Disposal, the pre-organizational stage of the organizational process, the
general theory it postulates concerns directly only concerted activity engaged in for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, not concerted
activity engaged in for the purpose of collective bargaining.
This general theory, however, should also be applicable to the
later processes that Justice Brennan defined: the process of collective
bargaining and the process of enforcement of the bargaining agreement.
Although those subsequent processes are clearly related to organizational activity, concerted conduct in which employees engage for "mutual aid or protection" may not necessarily be intended to achieve union
organization, at least not deliberately or initially. In some situations the
involved employees will have no present or foreseeable desire to organize into a union; in other cases they may have such a desire; and in
some situations such a desire might eventually develop. Such nexus between unstructured concerted activity and more formalized union activity is central to the legislative intent embedded in Section 7. Congress
thus intended' by the broad language of the provision to encourage a
flexible and relatively unstructured process. Hence, it should follow
that unrepresented, and usually ill-informed, employees ought not to be
required to act at their peril when they begin informal joint discussions,
for they may not yet be "looking toward group action." 130 But given
the opportunity, group action-be it mild or assertive-might in time
evolve from that rudimentary process.
In the early organizational stages of the process that Section 7 describes, employees need not be consciously aware that they are engaged
in a concerted act. They need only be involved in an act of association,
speech, or petition ("petition," in workplace terminology, being essentially the presentation of a grievance) that reasonably relates to "wages,
hours, [or] other terms and conditions of employment." ' It is important, however, that the employer must not have unreasonably interfered
with or denied their opportunity to engage in such activity. If equality
of organizational power is to have a meaning consistent with the policy
of the statute, then it follows that Section 7 guarantees (1) that employees will have the right to confer among themselves about any of the
foregoing matters; (2) that several employees may each voice a common
concern about such matters and thereby impliedly engage in concerted
activity; (3) that a single employee has the right to turn to one or more
fellow employees to seek mutual aid or protection as to such matters;
1I El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 996, 1004 (1st Cir. 1988)
(quoting Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964)).
1-- 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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and (4) that a single employee has the right to attempt to initiate an
action or seek support, for the benefit of the employees as a group, with
respect to such matters, regardless of whether she or he is ultimately
successful in that endeavor. The only restrictions the employer should
be able to place on such conduct are those for which there are "legitimate and substantial business justifications."' 3' 2
As I have noted previously, the several dimensions that characterize Section 7 activity are the dimensions of concertedness, object, and
conduct. In a given situation, some or all of these dimensions must be
evaluated both separately and comparatively. The analyses to be applied in such evaluations, discussed in the following sections, comprise
the building blocks of a general theory.
A.

Separate Evaluations

Perhaps the most logical way to begin evaluating a given fact situation is to ask and answer a series of questions. Each question addresses one of the three dimensions.
1. The First Question: Concertedness
The first question asks whether the employee or employees are engaged in activity that is either concerted or so related to concertedness
that the right to engage in concerted conduct is reasonably affected.
This question concerns whether the action involves employees as a
group or whether an individual employee is seeking to explore the possibility of, or is initiating, group activity. This question is crucial to the
coverage of the Act. Unless the question is answered in the affirmative,
Section 7 will be inapplicable to the conduct in question and that conduct would be per se unprotected. 33 The answer to the question will
not necessarily turn on an employee's perceived or articulated intent, or
on the Board's or a court's speculation as to such intent, because the
182 Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 918 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting NLRB
v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967)).
13 Activities by individual employees on their own behalf are not "concerted"
within the meaning of Section 7. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840,
845 (2d Cir. 1980) (arguing that "not only must the ultimate objective [of the action] be
'mutual' but the activity must be 'concerted' or, if taken by an individual ... must be
looking toward group action"; see supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text); Kohls v.
NLRB, 629 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that individual protesting work assignment not engaged in concerted activity); Del E. Webb Realty & Management Co.,
216 N.L.R.B. 593, 593 (1975) (holding that "where an individual employee turns to
his employer alone to improve this condition of employment and is in no sense joined in
his actions by any other workmen, he has not engaged in concerted activities in the
statutory sense and may be discharged").
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right to engage in the activity presupposes a preliminary stage of probing and uncertainty as to the direction the effort will take.
When employees deliberately act together, or agree to act together,
their conduct is clearly concerted. However, a finding of actual concertedness need not be based on explicit evidence of agreement or accord."" In view of the express statutory protection of the right to engage in such concerted activity, it would be appropriate in some cases
for the Board to find, on the basis of either implicit evidence or a presumption, that a single employee is engaged in concerted activity. A
presumption should arise if there is some reasonable link that connects
the employee's activity with similar expressions or acts by other employees, 35 or if the single employee's activity initiates a process that is
intended to benefit the employees generally. 3 6 An example of reasonable linkage would be a situation in which several different employees
have voiced a common complaint to their employer, after which the
employer disciplines a single employee for again voicing the same complaint. In such a case the Board could properly find concerted activity. 3' It may be presumed that the other employees, who expressed the
same complaint, tacitly authorized or made common cause with the one
who has had the temerity to speak up again on their behalf. Similarly,
an employee who seeks outside assistance for the benefit of the employees generally may be presumed to act with the support of other employees.138 In either case, the presumption could be rebutted by a showing
that the single employee speaks for no one but herself.1 9 Because a
single employee acting to improve conditions for the employees as a
group will more likely than not act with the approval of at least some
of her fellow employees, the Board should use a presumption to establish a prima facie case of concertedness in such a factual situation. The
statutory element of right to engage in concerted activity warrants a
liberal construction of facts that reasonably point toward concerted activity. A strict construction of such facts would tend to diminish the
right to engage in the activity that Section 7 protects. As the Supreme
Court concluded in a different context, though for similar policy reasons, "[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."1 4"
"' See infra notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
135

Id.

"' See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text; infra notes 237-59 and accompanying text.
137 See Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (Dec. 11, 1986); see
also infra notes 221-24 (discussing Every Woman's Place).
a See supra notes 190, 201-17 and accompanying text.
139 See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
140 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583
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In a literal sense, it is true that a discussion among employees
about a matter affecting their employment in which no agreement is
reached may not be "concerted," and perhaps it might never become
such. Nevertheless, such a discussion must be protected, because it is
from such exchanges that agreements, formal or informal, tacit or explicit, arise.1" 1 Thus, an employer's interference with or denial of the
opportunity for such discussion, absent legitimate justification for doing
so, constitutes a denial of the right to engage in concerted activity. Recalling the dictionary definition of the phrase "in concert," 4 2 it is conceivable that whatever employees do "together"-even talking among
themselves-could be consider concerted activity. But the statute indicates that the action must also be "mutual." Therefore, a more precise
reading of the language would seem to require that actual concertedness contain at least a minimum element of accord or agreement. Thus,
to avoid a gap in essential coverage, the Board and the courts need to
focus on the right to engage in concerted conduct as well as on the
conduct itself."4"
The foregoing discussion introduces one of the essential components of the general theory: that the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection is itself entitled to protection. However,
for purposes of this analysis, the right to engage in such activity will be
treated as one element in determining the existence of concertedness.
Accordingly, in this discussion, concertedness includes both literal concerted action and the right to engage in such action.
2.

The Second Question: Object

If the answer to the first question, regarding concertedness, is in
the affirmative, a second question becomes appropriate: What is the
object of the activity? This question explores whether the conduct is
engaged in for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, which includes
a broad range of objectives, or whether it is engaged in for one or more
of the specific statutory objectives of "self organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted activities
(1960) (referring to a presumption of arbitrability in construing labor agreements providing for arbitration under § 301 of the Taft-Harley Act).

See infra notes 235-59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951), is an example of the Board finding concertedness based on the action of a single employee. See supra notes 78-79 and
accompanying text. More accurately, the employee's conduct was protected because his
"right" to engage in concerted activity was protected.
141
142
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for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . ."I" Although the analysis in this Article focuses on the "mutual aid or protection" objectives,
the process of determining statutory coverage would be the same for
these other more specific objectives spelled out in the provision.
If it is found that the object of the activity is reasonably related to
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,"' 145 but
not necessarily within 148 that statutory definition of mandatory subjects
of bargaining, 147 the concerted conduct may be protected. However,
such protection may be restricted by one or more of four additional
factors: (1) whether the object is unlawful or contrary to public policy,
particularly the policy of the National Labor Relations Act; 4" (2)
whether and to what extent the employer has the capacity to control or
affect the object of the activity;14 (3) whether the employer has a legiti29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Id. at § 158(d).
148 See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 558-62 (1978); supra notes 107-13;
see also NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir.
1960) (holding that activities reasonably related to Section 7 rights should be protected); NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948) (same); Millcraft Furniture Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 83,
slip op. at 6 (Jan. 5, 1987) (stating that it "is well settled that concerted protest of
supervisory conduct is protected activity under § 7 of the Act").
147 See generally C. MORRIS, supra note 70, at 757-844; id. at Supp. IV at 36091.
14
This factor is addressed by many of the cases defining unprotected concerted
activity, at least those cases in which the activity is unprotected because of the object of
the conduct rather than because of the nature of the conduct itself. See supra notes 7174 and accompanying text. Some of these cases involve gray areas in which the Board
should be able to exercise its administrative discretion, subject only to limited judicial
review. See, e.g., Crystal Linen & Uniform Servs., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 946 (1985)
(holding unprotected, employee solicitation of employer's customers to transfer their
business during a strike); Bell Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n, 214 N.L.R.B. 75 (1974)
(holding unprotected, switchboard operator's disclosure to union of information about
frequency of calls to company's labor counsel). For coverage of administrative discretion
and judicial review, see infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), and NLRB v. Food & Chemical Workers, 108 S.
Ct. 413 (1988)).
149 Most of the subjects concerning the employment relationship about which employees tend to raise questions are matters that are so closely related to the objectives of
the statutes that concerted activity for such an object would ordinarily be deemed protected because an employer can control those subjects. See, e.g., NLRB v American
Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1240 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that wage rate
discussion among employees are protected); NLRB v Sencore, Inc., 558 F.2d 433, 434
(8th Cir. 1977) (noting that "higher wages are a frequent objective of organizational
activity and discussions about wages are necessary to further that goal"); Quality Pallet
Sys., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 2 (Feb. 15, 1988) (holding that protest
following a reduction in pay is concerted action). This would be true even if the conduct involves a work stoppage. See infra note 153. This would certainly apply regarding traditional matters directly affecting employment, such as wages, overtime, grievances, workplace environment, along with matters affecting the employees' immediate
144

145
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mate justification for limiting or preventing the conduct;1 5 0 and (4)
1 51
whether the nature of the conduct taints its object.
When the Board or a reviewing court examines any of these four
restrictive factors, it is important that they be fully cognizant of and
sensitive to the lucid language of the statutory provision, for "mutual
aid or protection" is not an arcane or ambiguous expression. The plain
meaning of "mutual" has previously been noted, 5 ' and "aid" and
"protection" are familiar concepts. The congressional intent, as well as
the language, is quite clear. Unless one or more of the four restrictive
factors are applicable, there is no room for the Board to exercise administrative discretion, because the Act mandates that such activity be
protected. When employees engage in concerted activity for an employment-related purpose, they are protected by the Act. And such protection applies regardless of the meager nature of their purpose. The purpose may simply be the "aid" that one employee feels from the
presence of another employee, or the "aid" or perceived "protection"
that a group of employees may feel by virtue of their being part of a
group, even when the group does not make overtures to management.
"Mutual aid or protection" even includes the aphorism, "misery loves
53
company.'1

supervision. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16 (1962). However, as will be noted under the separate discussion of the nature of the conduct, some
concerted activity, notwithstanding its proper and conventional object, may be deemed
unprotected because of the nature of the activity itself. See, e.g., supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text (illegal or disloyal conduct, or conduct in breach of contract is unprotected activity).
But, depending on the nature of the conduct, the employer's lack of control over
the object of the activity would not necessarily render the conduct unprotected. This
problem was illustrated in part by Eastex. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying
text. There, the employees had been seeking mutual aid and protection in the form of
solidarity with other employees outside their immediate place of employment. The
court held that distribution of a mild non-coercive newsletter, dealing with legislative
matters of concern to workers generally, was protected, even though the employer had
virtually no way to affect the objects of the action. See Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567. Had
the conduct consisted of a work stoppage, albeit for the same purpose, the concerted
activity might have been deemed unprotected. At least such an interpretation would
have been a permissible construction of the statute. Eastex thus demonstrates that the
object of the activity, in order to be protected, need not always be subject to the employer's control or ability to affect the outcome.
150 Such a justification, if one exists, may be related not only to the object of the
conduct, but also to the nature of the conduct, or both. But since this factor most often
relates to the nature of the activity, it will be discussed under the dimension of the
nature of the conduct in the discussion under the third question.
15'This area will also be treated separately in the discussion of the third question.
152 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
153 See infra notes 237-59 and accompanying text.
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3.

The Third Question: Conduct

If the answers to the first two questions have produced findings of
concertedness and proper object, the third question would then be
asked: Is the nature of the conduct such that it is entitled to protection? Or, to put it in the more familiar negative form, is the concerted
activity so offensive as not to merit the protection of the statute?
Concerted activity as mild as conversation among employees and
preparation and circulation of petitions or other written materials will
almost always be within the ambit of the statute.'" More vigorous and
assertive forms of concerted activity, such as a work stoppage, 155 conduct the Supreme Court deemed protected in Washington Aluminum,1 56 may also be within its ambit. As to any type of concerted conduct, however, two limitations could render the conduct unprotected:
(1) If the conduct violates law or policy or (2) if there is some legitimate business justification for the employer's limiting or preventing .the.
conduct, such as the need to maintain production or discipline.15 7 As to
the first kind of limitation, the same questions heretofore noted regarding object would arise; for example, concerted conduct of a violent, 58
15 See, e.g., NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley, Assocs., 657 F.2d 685, 688 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding that conversations among employees regarding improved working
conditions and circulation of a memo constituted protected concerted activity); OwensComing Fiberglass Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding that
circulation of petition regarding co-worker's difficulties in getting a ride home during a
personal emergency was protected activity); Glenwood Management Corp., 287
N.L.R.B. No. 113, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 29, 1988) (finding employees meeting with management to ask for a "decent" wage increase constituted protected conduct); Mac Tools,
Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 254, 259 (1984) (holding informal employees' meeting regarding
working condition and grievances was protected concerted conduct).
"I"See generally Getman, supra note 113 (supporting protection of economic
pressure brought by employees).
156 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16 (1962); supra notes
103-06 and accompanying text; see also NLRB v. McEver Eng'g, Inc., 784 F.2d 634,
636 (5th Cir 1986) (protecting work stoppage over "unusually hazardous conditions");
Triad Management Corp., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 132, slip op. at I n.1 (Feb. 25, 1988)
(protection work stoppage over wage decrease); Quality C.A.T.V., Inc., 278 N.L.R.B.
1282, 1282 (1986) (protecting work stoppage which consisted of refusal to climb wet
utility poles); Daniel Constr. Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 795, 795 (1985) (protecting work
stoppage over adverse working conditions).
'W The business justification, however, must be legitimate. See, e.g., ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 622, 625 (1986) (affirming an ALJ's conclusion that "[tihe
possibility that ordinary speech and discussion over wages on an employee's own time
may cause jealousies and strife among employees is not a justifiable business reason to
inhibit the opportunity for an employee to exercise Section 7 rights"); see also Stein
Seal Co. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding restriction of employee's inplant movements violated Section 8(a)(1)); Waco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 746 (1984)
(holding that an unexcused absence is a legitimate business reason for dismissal).
158 See Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984) (finding threats
and damage to property legitimate business reasons for dismissal), enfoced mem. 765
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disloyal,"5 9 or disruptive nature,16 0 or concerted conduct that violates
other laws, such as the law of trespass, 61 may be unprotected. As to
the second kind of limitation, the legitimate justification for interference
by the employer, important problems of proof are presented. When an
employer interferes with the right of its employees to engage in otherwise protected activity, there is a presumption, which may be rebutted,
that such interference violates Section 8(a)(1)."2 When employer interests and employee rights are found to be in conflict, it is the function of
the Board to strike an appropriate balance in accordance with the policy of the statute. At the pre-organizational stage, that balance would
almost always be struck with the acknowledgement that "time outside
working hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or
rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unrea16 3
sonable restraint, although the employee is on company property.)
B.

Comparative Evaluations

Having examined and described the separate aspects of the three
dimensions of Section 7 activity, it is now appropriate to investigate the
manner in which the dimensions affect each other. By dividing the issues relating to concerted activity for mutual aid or protection into their
constituent elements, the formulation of the general theory in this Article invites the Board, subject to appropriate judicial review, and the
courts in the exercise of their proper reviewing roles,"" to recognize
which of the elements are relatively inelastic and which are elastic. The
more elastic the element, the more appropriate the exercise of the
Board's administrative discretion. To the extent that the two highly
elastic dimensions, object and conduct, require comparison in a given
fact situation, it will be the function of the Board to exercise its administrative discretion to effectuate the policy of the Act. But as to the
relatively inelastic dimension of concertedness, there will be less room
F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); cf 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) (providing in part that "[n]o
order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual ... if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause").
109 See supra note 73.
160 See Crystal Linen & Uniform Servs., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 946 (1985); Bell Fed.
Says. & Loan Ass'n, 214 N.L.R.B. 75 (1974); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 336
(1950).
161 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
162 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945); Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 n.4 (3d Cir. 1976); see also supra notes 11426 and accompanying text (discussing Republic Aviation and Jeannette).
16 Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), quoted with approval in
Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 & n.10 (1945).
164 See infra text accompanying notes 170-74.

1989]

SECTION 7 CONDUCT

1709

for the exercise of administrative discretion.
The dimension of concertedness will generally be relatively inelastic because a particular fact pattern can ordinarily be found to be either
concerted or not, without regard to the characteristics of the other two
dimensions. Therefore, if concerted action exists, and there is no question regarding object or conduct, the action is protected. However, there
are a few gray areas where administrative discretion might be appropriate. In particular, the Board can use its discretion regarding constructive concerted activity based on the conduct of a single employee.1 6 5
On the other hand, the dimensions of object and conduct are relatively elastic. Each of the latter dimensions is subject to being found
protected or unprotected, depending on the quality of the corresponding
dimension. Each is subject to being pulled in one direction or another-protected or unprotected-depending on the relative weight
each is accorded in the circumstances of particular cases. For example,
if the object of the conduct is fairly far removed from the direct concern
of the workplace, whether the conduct will be deemed protected or not
may depend on how mild or how coercive it is. A work stoppage or
picketing for a remote object might thus be unprotected, whereas a conversation or the circulation of a flyer or petition among employees on
their own time, for the same remote object, would likely be deemed
protected. 6 The opposite situation would require a similar weighing
process: If the object concerns a highly relevant workplace issue, such
as distribution of overtime, but the means, i.e., the conduct, consists of
intermittent work stoppages or a sitdown strike, such coercive activity
would assuredly be deemed unprotected. 167 To the extent that the elements of object and conduct require comparison in a given fact situation, the Board may exercise its administrative discretion to effectuate
the policy of the Act. Discussion below of the six scenarios will further
illustrate each of these three elements and the applicable processes that
should be used to analyze them.
1'5

See supra text accompanying notes 78-84; infra text accompanying notes 198-

219.
168 See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978) (holding that employee distribution of union newsletter which concerned political matters not within the
employer's control, was protected by the Act). Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
indicated that if some concerted activities bear a less immediate relationship to the employees' interests, those activities may not fall within the "mutual aid or protection"
clause of the Act. Id. at 567-68.
187 See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 39-40 (1942); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 248-49 (1939); supra text accompanying notes
71 & 161; ef. U.A.W., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949) (finding it within the power of the State to prohibit irregular work stoppages
when no specific demands were being made or concessions sought).
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The Union Factor

The presence or absence of a union is also a variable that must be
considered in the evaluation of Section 7 conduct. At the pre-organizational stage, on which this Article focuses, the union is important by its
absence, a factor the Supreme Court noted in Washington Aluminum. 168 Unrepresented employees are deemed entitled to greater leeway in the manner in which they engage in their concerted activity.
Indeed, many of these cases will involve an employee's first attempt to
act in concert. On the other hand, whefn a union is present, particularly
if it is actively involved in the conduct in question, a higher standard of
accountability will ordinarily be appropriate. Whether particular conduct is deemed protected may be influenced by, or even be dependent
upon, not only the presence of a union but also the relative position of
the union in the hierarchy of Section 7 activity.'6 9
D.

Applying the Theory

The formulation of the above components and procedures applicable to Section 7 protection of employees who may be engaged in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection spells out a general theory
designed to facilitate the process of determining what conduct is protected and what conduct is not. This general theory can be useful both
for the purpose of determining clear statutory intent, which is ultimately a judicial function, and for the purpose of determining statutory
policy, which is the Board's function when it exercises its administrative discretion to arrive at a permissible construction of the language of
Section 7.
The two areas of statutory application contemplated by the congressional mandate are, in my view, fairly well marked as to Section 7.
"8 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962).
For example, it will make a difference whether the union is present at the
polarized organizational stage, or at a later stage of responsible collective bargaining, or
perhaps at an even more mature stage involving the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement containing both a no-strike clause and a grievance/arbitration procedure.
For further implications of the union presence, for example the matter of balancing
property rights and Section 7 conduct, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1975);
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B.
No. 4 (Sept. 27, 1988). However, the detailed effect of the union's presence at the
various stages of section 7 activity is beyond the reach of this Article, this being only a
glimpse at a general theory that concentrates only on the pre-organizational stage. But
I mention these additional elements because they are important for the long-run evaluation and application of Section 7 throughout all of the processes enumerated by Justice
Brennan in NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984). See supra notes
61-63 and accompanying text (discussing City Disposal).
189
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In the first area, where clear statutory intent exists, there is no room
for exercise of administrative discretion. In the second area, where the
statute is either silent or ambiguous, the Board can properly exercise its
administrative discretion. Both areas will be illustrated in the discussion
of the scenarios treated in this Article. And both areas will presumably
now be governed by the Supreme Court's sharp differentiation, as expressed in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun1 71 and NLRB v.
cil, Inc.,1 0 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
Food & Com1
7
2
mercial Workers, between the roles of administrative agencies and
reviewing courts in interpreting statutes that the agencies administer. 73
In Food and Commercial Workers, the Court affirmed that the
application of the standards of judicial review prescribed in Chevron
and Cardoza-Fonsecawere applicable to the Board's interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act. It defined the judicial role as
follows:
On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is
to try to determine congressional intent, using "traditional
tools of statutory construction." If we can do so, then that
interpretation must be given effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it . . . . However, where
"the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
. . . Under this principle, we have traditionally accorded the
Board deference with regard to its interpretation of the
NLRA as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent
with the statute.1 74
Accordingly, in applying and interpreting Section 7 it is important
to distinguish between what the provision requires and what the provision permits. The formulation of the general theory herein is an attempt to provide a rational framework for the performance of that task.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
172 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987); cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Co. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988) (recognizing the usual deference
paid to the Board's interpretation of the NLRA but stating "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious Constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress").
170
271

173 See Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988).
174 Food & Commercial Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 421 (citations omitted).
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TESTING THE THEORY: Two REAGAN BOARDS, SIX
SCENARIOS, AND THE STATUTORY DIRECTIVE

It is not easy to understand the current Board's interpretation of
Section 7 language relating to concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, in part because of the Board's recent ambivalence about its own
nominal rule or rules. The rule, of course, is the Meyers rule. But
which Meyers rule: that of Meyers I or of Meyers II?' Although Meyers I formally states the rule, Meyers II, to a large degree, interprets it.
The two decisions are quite different, not only because the Board was
required to reconsider the case on remand from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, but also because, with the passage of time, the
Board's membership had changed. Two Reagan Boards, Reagan
Board I and Reagan Board II, considered these cases, and those are
decidedly different Boards.' Reagan Board I displayed an essentially
revisionist attitude toward the statute, 7' and a significant number of its
more controversial rulings have been reversed or remanded by the reviewing courts.'17 Meyers I was one such case. In contrast, Reagan
'" Meyers Indus. Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Sept. 30, 1986), enforced sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [Prill II], cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2847 (1988).
17. Reagan Board I extended roughly from 1984 through 1985 and Reagan
Board II extended roughly from 1986 through the end of 1988. The periods generally
coincided with the time-span in which Chairman Dotson was voting with the majority
on critical cases (Reagan Board I) and the span in which he was filing his numerous
dissents and also the remaining period in 1988 after his departure (Reagan Board II).
177 See Morris, Harper & Van Os, Panelists Debate Merits of Current NLRB
Decisions at Meeting in Dallas, Daily Labor Rep. (BNA) No. 68, Apr. 9, 1985, at A2.
See generally Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase I, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 130-31
(1985) (analyzing reversals of the Reagan Board and arguing that they reflect a reduction in employee protection and a significant curtailment of union power); Morris &
Turk, A Labor Roundup and Forecast: The Balance Continues to Shift, 11 EMPL.
REL. L.J. 32, 54-55 (1985) (reviewing significant decisions of the Reagan Board and
arguing that they demonstrate a conservative shift favoring management over labor).
178 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Co. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1396 (1988); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
481 U.S. 573, 588 (1987); NLRB v. International Longshoremens' Ass'n, 472 U.S. 61
(1985); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1395, 797 F.2d 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986); Financial Inst.
Employees of Am., 752 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'g 265 N.L.R.B. 426 (1982),
affd, 475 U.S. 192 (1986); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 1104
(1985) [Dupont II], rev'd and remanded sub. nom. Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120
(3d Cir. 1986); Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub. nom., Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [Prill I], cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), on
remand, Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [Prill II], cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2847 (1988); Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 476 (1983), rev'd and
remanded sub. nom. Ewing v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir.), on remand Herbert
F. Darling, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 346 (1984) [Darling I1], rev'd and remanded sub.
nom. Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985) [Ewing II], on remand Herbert F.
Darling, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (Feb. 29, 1988) [Darling III].
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Board II made more of an effort to enforce the statute in accordance
with its terms. Nevertheless, at least in the area of protected concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection, Reagan Board II seemed unable
to formulate a clear statement of either policy or interpretive standards.
This may have been due in part to its face-saving reluctance to abandon the rule of Meyers I; consequently, the current Board has paid lip
service to Meyers I while actually applying the broader principles of
Meyers 11.179
The promulgation of the Meyers rule illustrates the gamut of
problems that attend rulemaking by adjudication. Rather than give notice to the labor-management community that it was considering the
issuance of a new, comprehensive rule to govern concerted activity, and
thereby allow and encourage the marshalling of facts and arguments in
healthy debate, Reagan Board I issued the rule in question in an obscure case involving one individual, Kenneth Prill, and his employer,
Meyers Industries. The Board was ostensibly only reversing the rule of
Alleluia Cushion Co., 8 ' but in reality it was promulgating, albeit in
the form of dicta, a new and comprehensive definition of protected concerted activity.
A.

The Concept of Constructive Concerted Activity
Scenario Number 1: Meyers Industries, Inc. 8 '

The first scenario involves a truck driver, Kenneth Prill, who was
employed by an aluminum boat company in Michigan. Prill had repeatedly complained to his employer about the unsafe condition of the
equipment that he had been assigned to drive. After an accident in
Tennessee, which the Board found was caused by malfunctioning
brakes, Prill contacted the Tennessee Public Service Commission to arrange for an inspection. The inspection resulted in a citation that put
the unit out of service. Two days later he was called in by his superviSee Hamilton Plastics, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Oct. 31, 1988); Owens Illinois,
Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Sept. 22, 1988); Whittaker Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 116
(July 18, 1988); Oakes Machine Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (Apr. 14, 1988); Quality
Pallet Sys., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (Feb. 15, 1988); Glenwood Management
Corp., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (Jan. 29, 1988); Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B.
No. 101 (Apr. 21, 1987); Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (Apr. 19, 1987);
Joseph De Rario, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Apr. 10, 1987); Milicraft Furniture Co., 282
N.L.R.B. No. 83 (Jan. 5, 1987); Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48
(Dec. 11, 1986); Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Nov. 13, 1986).
18O 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975), overruled, Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984),
remanded sub nom. Prill I, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985).
1 Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
179
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sor and discharged because "we can't have you calling the cops like this
all the time."'" 2 The Administrative Law Judge found Prill's activity to
be concerted under the Board's then effective Alleluia doctrine.
Reagan Board I disagreed, overruling Alleluia.' 3 In Alleluia, the
Board had held that a single employee's invocation to an external public agency about an employment-related matter constituted protected
concerted activity. Such finding of constructive concerted activity was
based on a presumption that "consent of action emanates from the mere
assertion of statutory rights."'" The Board declared that "in the absence of any evidence that fellow employees disavow such representation" it would find an "implied consent thereto."'8 5 Although not expanded upon, the Alleluia Board also provided another basis for its
holding: that an employer's retaliation against the whistle-blowing employee would have a chilling effect on other employees seeking outside
86

assistance.1
182

Prill I, 755 F.2d at 945.

See Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 493. Alleluia involved an employee in a nonunion plant, Jack Henley, who was discharged for writing a letter to the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) about alleged safety violations.
The Administrative Law Judge ruled that his activity was unprotected because he had
never discussed the matter with any fellow employees. The Board, however, found the
activity protected, reasoning that it would be incongruous with the public policy enunciated in the OSHA legislation "to presume that, absent outward manifestation of support, Henley's fellow employees did not agree with his efforts to secure compliance
with the statutory obligations imposed on [the employer] for their benefit." Alleluia,
221 N.L.R.B. at 1000.
18 Alleluia, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000.
18I

185

Id.

The Board stated that Henley's discharge, one day after OSHA had inspected
the workplace, "would indicate to the other employees the danger of seeking assistance
from Federal or state agencies in order to obtain their statutorily guaranteed working
conditions." Id.
Following Alleluia, the doctrine of constructive concerted activity was applied to
other situations in which employees had appealed to outside authority for assistance in
correcting perceived employer wrongdoings or in enforcing employment related legislation. See, e.g., Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1257 (1978) (requesting management to investigate an abusive supervisor was protected activity); Bighorn Beverage,
236 N.L.R.B. 736, 755 (1978) (discharging an employee for reporting unsafe practices
to a state agency was an unfair labor practice), vacated, 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir.
1980); Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1071 (1977) (holding that employee's
attempt to determine employer's financial status was protected activity), enforcement
denied, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979); Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290, 291
(holding that work stoppage in support of a grievance concerning conditions of employment-equal pay for equal work-was protected), enforcement denied, 566 F.2d 1079
(8th Cir. 1977); Triangle Tool & Eng'g Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1357 (1976) (discharging an employee for reporting to the Wage and Hour Division was an unfair
labor practice).
The doctrine did not, however, fare well in the Circuits. The leading example of
appellate rejection of Alleluia was Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1980), denying enforcement to 245 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1979). The Krispy
188
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Reagan Board I seized the opportunity provided by Meyers I to
redefine the meaning of Section 7's language to require the existence of
literal concertedness. This new rule, justified primarily by the bald assertion that such a definition was "mandated by the statute itself,"1 8
states:
In general, to find an employee's activity to be "concerted,"
we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the
employee himself. Once the activity is found to be concerted,
an 8(a)(1) violation will be found if, in addition, the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee's activity, the concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the
adverse employment action at issue (e.g., discharge) was motivated by the employee's protected concerted activity. 8
On review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in a penetrating opinion written by Judge Edwards, reversed and remanded the
case because the Board had erroneously held that its narrow interpretation of concerted activity was statutorily required and because it had
also relied on a misinterpretation of prior Board and court precedent.
In particular, the court's opinion stressed that the Supreme Court's
holding in City Disposal'8 9 had "made clear that Section 7 does not
compel a narrowly literal interpretation of 'concerted activities,' but
rather [it] is to be construed by the Board in light of its expertise in
labor relations."' 9 0 Judge Edwards reminded the Board that the Court
in City Disposal had emphasized that, "[w]hat is not self-evident from
Kreme court relied on the Third Circuit's formulation in Mushroom Transp. Co. v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964), see supra text accompanying notes 80-85, to
conclude that for a single employee's activity to be deemed concerted, it must have been
"'engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or
that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees.'" Krispy
Kreme, 635 F.2d at 307 (citing Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d at 685). The Fourth
Circuit contended that the Alleluia presumption was primarily "theoretical," id. at
307, 308, for the single employee's action would be "for the benefit of other employees
only in a theoretical sense." Id. The court thus ignored the fact that the Act protects
the "right" to engage in concerted activity as well as actual concerted activity. But
inasmuch as the Board itself had failed to focus on the "right," it is not surprising that
the court focused solely on conduct that was overtly related to concerted activity.
I87
Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496.
188 Id. at 497.
189 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
190 Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 951 (D.C. Cir.) [Prill I], cert. denied, 474 U.S.
948 (1985). Noting the absence of any reference to the possibility of a chilling effect,
Judge Edwards also chided the Board for failing "even to consider whether the discharge of an employee because of his safety complaints would discourage other employees from engaging in collective activity to improve working conditions." Id. at 953.
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.is the precise manner in which particular

actions of an individual employee must be linked to the actions of fellow employees in order to permit it to be said that the individual is
engaged in concerted activity."'' Accordingly, on the basis of the rule
of SEC v. Chenery Corp. ("Chenery I"), 9
' Meyers I was remanded
for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, the Board's membership had changed. It was now
Reagan Board II that received the case on remand and decided Meyers I.'1s Although the decision paid lip service to the Meyers I rule, or
at least the first part of it,'" the opinion provided such a broad interpretation of the earlier decision that much of the damage of the original
rule was abated.
Meyers II expressly affirmed the portion of the Meyers I rule that
stated that "to find an employee's activity to be 'concerted,' [it must] be
engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely
191City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 830-31. In City Disposal, the Court approved the'
Board's Interboro doctrine. See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966)
(holding that the action of a single employee in asserting rights under a collective bargaining agreement is protected concerted activity under Section 7), enforced, 388 F.2d
495 (2d Cir. 1967); see supra note 75 (discussing Interboro).
192 318 U.S. 80 (1943). In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [Chenery I1], the Court articulated the Chenery rule:
to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or
judgement which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make,
must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers
to be a more adequate or proper basis.
Id. at 196. The Court also noted an "important corollary of the . . .rule[:] If the
administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that
basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable." Id.
193 Chairman Dotson joined in the opinion in Meyers II, which I find inexplicable in view of his later dissenting and concurring opinions in Every Woman's Place,
Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (Dec. 11, 1986) and Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B.
No. 101 (Apr. 21, 1987).
19
Curiously, Meyers 11 omitted reference to the second part of the rule, the requirement of employer knowledge and unlawful motivation. I hesitate to comment on
the meaning of this omission, if it has meaning, for the missing part was later included,
but without comment, in Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7
(Feb. 29, 1988) [Darling II]. The absence of unlawful motivation is not ordinarily a
defense in a Section 8(a)(1) case. See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21, 22-23
(1964); ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 738
(1961). At the very least, however, the ambiguity attached to the employer-knowledgeand-motive part of the Meyers I rule underscores the inadequacy of the process of
promulgating substantive rules of broad application in dicta of adjudicated cases. No
one can really know whether this second part of the Meyers I rule is prevailing law,
because it was not part of the case which was reviewed by the D.C. Court of Appeals
in Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [Prill II], cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
2847 (1988).
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by and on behalf of the employee himself." ' But Reagan Board II
did not permit that seemingly rigid language to carry its own plain
meaning. Instead of requiring an agency-like authorization if an employee's act was to be protected, the Board explained, by way of interpretative glosses, that the provision really meant something else:
On linkage:
[J]oint employee action [is] the touchstone for our analysis. . . . The definition of concerted activity which the
Board provided in Meyers I proceeds logically from such an
analysis insofar as it requires some linkage to group action
in order for conduct to be deemed "concerted.". . . [The
Meyers I definition is] expansive enough to include individual activity which is connected to collective activity.19 6

On group activity:
When the record evidence demonstrates group activities,
whether "specifically authorized" in a formal agency sense,
9
or otherwise, we shall find the conduct to be concerted.

On single employee activity:
There is nothing in the Meyers I definition which states that
Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 11 (Sept. 30, 1986), enforced
sub nom. Prill II, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2847
(1988).
198 Meyers 11, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 6-7 (emphasis added). This may
be only loose "linkage." See Salisbury Hotel, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, slip op. at 6-7;
Every Woman's Place, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48, slip op. at 1-2; see also Whittaker Corp.,
289 N.L.R.B. No. 116, slip op. at 5-6 (July 18, 1988) (holding that employee protest
at employee meeting called by management regarding withholding of annual pay-increase was protected); Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 91, slip op. at 5 (Apr. 19,
1987) (finding that employee's speaking to another employee about matters raised at an
employee gripe session called by management was protected concerted activity).
197 Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 13. Never mind that this interpretation appears to contradict the plain meaning of the words in the original rule, thus
providing further evidence of the hazards of rulemaking by adjudication.
For examples of when the Board has found employee's activity "authorized" and
therefore protected, see Hamilton Plastics, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 2 (Oct. 31,
1988) (holding that employee's complaint is concerted because it involved several other
employees); Owens Illinois, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. No. 155, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 22, 1988)
(finding that employer's perception that employee was acting with other employees was
evidence of concerted action); Oakes Machine Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 52, slip op. at
1-2 (Apr. 14, 1988) (finding that unsigned letter's use of "we" gave adequate notice of
concerted nature of employee's complaint); Joseph De Rario, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 86,
slip op. at 5-6 (Apr. 10, 1987) (finding employee authorized to talk on behalf of other
employees); Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 6-7 (Nov. 13,
1986) (finding that a coworker's silent acquiescence was sufficient to find that the active employee acted "on the authority of" the coworker).
15
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conduct engaged in by a single employee at one point in time
can never constitute concerted activity within the meaning of
Section 7.
[W]e intend that Meyers I be read as fully embracing the
view of concertedness exemplified by the Mushroom Transportation line of cases .

. .

. [O]ur definition of concerted

activity in Meyers I encompasses those circumstances where
individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of management.
[I]ndividual activity "looking toward group action"
deemed concerted. 19 s

is

Notwithstanding the explanatory glosses, Meyers II failed to recognize the true relationship between activity for mutual aid or protection and group action, because it failed to see that the former is but a
prelude to group action, and, therefore, entitled to protection as part of
the right to engage in such action. The Board even "freely acknowledged that efforts to invoke the protection of statutes benefiting employees are efforts engaged in for the purpose of 'mutual aid of protection,' "189 but it failed to make the logical connection between such
activity and the benefit other employees would receive. Instead of addressing the presumption created by Alleluia, it set up two other possibilities as straw men: "either . . . to indulge in a presumption that

all statutes that benefit employees are the product of concerted employee activity or

. .

. to make factual inquiries into who had worked

for passage of the law in question."200 The Board then, promptly, and
probably correctly, proceeded to demolish both of those far-fetched possibilities. But nowhere did it address the real presumption raised by
Alleluia, which was a rebuttable presumption, not a per se rule as both
Reagan Boards were fond of claiming.20 ' Member Zimmerman, in his
dissent in Meyers I, paraphrased the Alleluia presumption as follows:
[I]t is reasonable to presume that when an individual
199

Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 11, 15-16; see Ontario Knife Co.

v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330

F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
199 Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 17.
200

Id. at 19.

See Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 6, 15 (Feb.
29, 1988) [Darling III], affd sub nom. Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353 (2d Cir.
1988); Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495.
201
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employee invokes a statute governing a condition in the
workplace he is within the scope of employee action contemplated by the Act . .

.

.[I]t would be incongruous with the

public policy embedded in employment-related legislation
.. .to assume that, in the absence of an express manifestation of support, other employees do not collectively share an
interest in an attempted vindication of the statutory right
created for their benefit ....
Making this presumption does not end the matter; it
merely shifts the burden to the employer to show that, in a
particular case, the employees, for whatever reasons, opposed
the individual's assertion of that interest or that the individual specifically acted in his own interest. 2
Member Zimmerman's interpretation of the statute would have
been wholly consistent with Section 7 policy, because his concept of
constructive concerted activity provided meaningful protection for the
"right" to engage in such activity. This is not to say, however, that such
an interpretation was required by the statute, for here we may be dealing with an area in which the statute is silent or ambiguous. But if the
Board chose, as it did, to reject that interpretation, it was obligated to
provide a rational basis consistent with the policy of the Act for doing
SO.
Was the interpretation that it provided rational and consistent
with the statute? 20 3 Primarily, the Board avoided commenting on the
real Alleluia presumption, notwithstanding that such presumption was
backed by essentially the same reasoning as the presumption that the
Supreme Court had approved in Republic Aviation.2" 4 Meyers II purported to rely on City Disposal, but in fact it relied on a misreading of
that case. It is true, as the Board noted, that the Court there "found
'concerted' activity because the employee's invocation of the contract
202

Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 503; see also Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51 (2d

Cir. 1985) [Ewing II].
We reject the view of the Fourth Circuit in Krispy Kreme, that the
presumption is irrebuttable and that therefore the concertedness requirement is read out of the Act ....
Just as an employer may show that a
presumptively invalid no-solicitation rule is "necessary in order to maintain production or discipline," an employer may demonstrate that an employee's presumptively concerted action was, in fact, frivolous or in bad
faith and, therefore, both unprotected and lacking in group support.
Id. at 56 (citation omitted).
203 See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). See supra notes 11215 & 195 and accompanying text (discussing Republic Aviation).
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was an extension of the collective employee activity that produced the
contract,12 0 5 but that was only because the Court had before it a ma-

ture collective bargaining relationship that allowed this easy reference
to collective action in City Disposal. But the situation under Section 7
at the pre-organizational stage is different, so Alleluia and Meyers need
not depend on existing concerted activity. It suffices that the right to
engage in such activity be material to that issue. Accordingly, the Board
should have directly addressed the Alleluia presumption and also the
question of whether the discharge or discipline of an employee who
seeks outside assistance has a chilling effect on other employees who
might later wish to engage in conduct protected by Section 7.
The Board's treatment of the latter question, which had been specifically posed by Judge Edwards,"0 6 was to beg the question. Its first
response was contained in Meyers II, but it had much more to say on
2 0 7 case, in which it reaffirmed
the subject in the Darling
the rule of
Meyers I, at least as modified by Meyers I. The Meyers II response
was categoric: it simply declared, without benefit of any developed record on the subject, empirical data, or reference to reasoned expert opinion, that: "We do not view Prill's discharge as having a 'chilling effect'
on the exercise of Section 7 rights by other employees.

' 20 8

Notwith-

standing that it was consciously promulgating a rule-for Meyers II
opened with the statement that Meyers I "defined the concept of concerted activity for purposes of Section 7" 2 0 -the Board suddenly
switched gears to the adjudicatory mode, saying that it found no chilling effect in Prill's activity because "[t]he record fails to establish that
his purely individual activities were 'related to other employees' concerted activities' in any demonstrable manner."21 In the first place, the
Board had no proper basis for making that specific finding, for it did
not remand the case to the Administrative Law Judge for development
of evidence on that issue and the matter had not been an issue in the
original trial because of the prevailing Alleluia presumption. In the
second place, and more importantly, this was a rule of general application. Therefore, the Board should have used either of two possible options available to it: (1) It could have relied upon the type of reasoning
and expertise that it had employed in fashioning the rule and presumption regarding solicitation on an employee's own time, as enunciated in
Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. at 17.
See supra note 182.
Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (Feb. 29, 1988) [Darling Il], affd sub nom. Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1988).
20I Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 20.
200 Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
210 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
20
206
207
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Peyton Packing1 1 and Republic Aviation;212 or, (2) it could have relied
upon expert opinion or empirical evidence gleaned from a notice-andcomment APA rulemaking proceeding.2" 3
The Board's more extensive response in Darlingwas prompted by
the Second Circuit's intimation that the layoff of employee Ewing,
which the Board found to have been based on the employer's belief that
Ewing had filed a safety complaint with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, may have had a "'chilling effect' on other employees' concerted activity."2" 4 This time the Board provided an explanation that was premised on an approach that the Board and the Supreme Court had long ago specifically rejected in Republic Aviation" 5
and many other cases, which was that there must be proof of specific
harm in the specific case. Looking at the record in the specific case, but
again not remanding it for further development on the point in issue,
the Board concluded that there had been no chilling effect because there
was no "connection to other employees' concerted activities." 21' 6 Rather
than drawing the logical inference as to what message such discipline
would ordinarily send to other employees, the Board had again made it
clear that it would look only to the particular fact situation. Based on a
narrow reading of the facts in Darling, it found:
no contention that the Respondent thought or communicated
to other employees that it considered Ewing's suspected activity as tied to any group action. In fact, the record shows
that, at the time, there was not any ongoing group activity
relating to safety complaints at the respondent's jobsite. [AcPeyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943)
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945).
213 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); see also supra note 129 and accompanying text.
214 Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 8 (Feb. 29, 1988)
[Darling III], affd sub noma. Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1988).
215 In Republic Aviation the employers (Republic and La Tourneau) contended:
211

212

that there must be evidence before the Board to show that the rules and
orders of the employers interfered with and discouraged union organization in the circumstances and situation of each company. Neither in the
Republic nor the Le Tourneau cases can it properly be said that there was
evidence or a finding that the plant's physical location made solicitation
away from company property ineffective to reach prospective union
members.
Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798-99.
21' Darling II, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 14. Although Darling III was
affirmed on appeal, the appellate court's decision was critical of the Board's reasoning,
noting that "[tihe Board's conclusion that a single employer's invocation of a statutory
empoloyment right is not 'concerted activity' under § 7 is not, in our view, preferable.
Nevertheless, we reluctantly conclude that the Board has offered a reasonable interpretation of the Act." 861 F.2d at 355.
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cordingly,] we do not see the action against Ewing as signaling a message to others to refrain from concerted activity,
any more than we found such a signal in Prill's situation in
Meyers II, where we noted that he "acted alone and without
an intent to enlist the support of other employees." 21
The Board thus avoided answering the right question: whether the discipline of Prill and Ewing respectively would generally have the effect
of discouraging other employees from reporting such violations in the
future or from engaging in any other protected concerted activity, regardless of the intent of either the whistle blowing employee or his employer. But elsewhere the same Board has conceded that when more
than one employee report a violation, their similar but separate activity
is deemed concerted even though they did not necessarily plan to act in
concert.21 How then can the example made of those such as Prill or
Ewing fail to represent to a prospective but cautious whistle blower a
denial of the right to engage in similar protected conduct?
Although the concept of constructive concerted activity in Alleluia
may not be required by the statute, the Board should nevertheless be
required to articulate the rationality of its current interpretation and
explain fully its rejection of the prior Alleluia rule.21 9 Thus far, in my
view, it has failed to comply with that basic administrative responsibility. However, the panel of the District of Columbia Circuit that reviewed Meyers II was less demanding. In a brief opinion (Prill II)
written by Judge Silberman, the court uncritically affirmed the Board's
case-oriented treatment of the Alleluia presumption. 22 ' Although the
decision was entirely case-oriented rather than rule-oriented, for purposes of notice to the employment law community, Meyers stands as a
rule.
B.

The Concept of Concertedness

22
Scenario Number 2: Every Woman's Place 1

An employee was fired for calling the Wage and Hour Division of
Id. (citing Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 20).
See id. at 12; Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, slip op. at 6-7
(Apr. 21, 1987); Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48, slip op. at 1-2
(Dec. 11, 1986); infra text accompanying notes 214-28.
21 See infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text (emphasizing the need for clarity and full explanation when the Board changes an existing rule).
220 See Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [Prill I1], cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2847 (1988).
221 Every Woman's Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (Dec. 11, 1986).
217
218
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the Department of Labor, on her own initiative, after several employees
had each complained about a holiday overtime matter. The employer,
which was engaged in providing shelter and counseling services to runaway youths, had recently reorganized as a result of merger, and the
staff was concerned about the prospect of changes in working conditions
and compensation. Several employees, during regular staff meetings
with their supervisors, asked one of the managers what the new holiday
and compensatory policy would be. His answers were inconclusive. So
employee Cathy Doran, solely on her own initiative, called the Wage
and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor and
asked how employees were legally entitled to be paid when they
worked on holidays.222 She then relayed to management the information she received, but management was displeased with her action and
subsequently discharged her.
The Board's majority opinion held that her call to the Department
of Labor was "sufficiently linked to group activity to constitute 'concerted' activity" on the authority of Meyers 11.223 Her phone call was
deemed the "logical outgrowth" of the earlier protest by other employees. It is not surprising that Chairman Dotson dissented. He charged
his colleagues with ignoring the dictates of Meyers I, which had required that the protected employee be the "group's specifically designated agent.12 24 But Meyers II controlled. Indeed, Every Woman's
Place demonstrates the basic difference between the holdings in the two
Meyers cases.
Based on Doran's call to the Wage and Hour Division, Chairman
Dotson accused his colleagues of applying the Alleluia presumption.
Actually, that call was significant only for its triggering effect on management; it was not significant to establish the existence of concerted
activity. As it was explained earlier in the discussion of the general
theory, the statutory element of the right to engage in concerted activity
warrants the Board finding the existence of concert based on a liberal
construction of facts pointing to concert. Thus the fact that several employees, including Cathy Doran, had raised the question about the holiday overtime matter was sufficient for the Board to recognize the existence of a presumption. It presumed that the other employees who had
raised the same questions tacitly authorized or made common cause
with Doran when she carried the question a step further by calling the
Wage and Hour Division. The majority was correct in finding suffi222 Doran testified, "I took it upon myself to call the Wage and Hour Division."
Id. at 7 (Dotson dissenting).
223 Id. at 2.
224 Id. at 7-8 (Dotson, dissenting).
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cient linkage.
Scenario Number 3: Salisbury Hotel2 25
The third scenario involves an employee who was fired for speaking up about a lunchbreak problem that concerned her and several
other employees. Cheryl Resnick worked for a New York hotel in a job
that was not covered by a union contract. The problem began when
the company changed its lunch hour policy. Reservation desk employees
had formerly been permitted to forego their lunch hour and also allowed to leave an hour early or report an hour late. When the company
announced a new policy that all employees must now take their lunch
hour, the front office manager qualified that policy by announcing that
only women would be required to take the lunch break "[b]ecause it's
'
the law . . . women have to take a lunch hour."226
Everybody balked,
but Resnick was the most vocal complainer; in fact she did more than
complain. She called the United States Department of Labor and was
told that it was unlawful to apply the lunchbreak policy only to
women. She reported this to her supervisor, who said he "stood corrected [and] from then on everybody was taking lunch hours. 2 2 7 Two
weeks later Resnick was fired. The Board found that she was discharged because (1) she had complained to other employees and to the
company about the lunch hour policy, (2) she had contacted the Department of Labor, and (3) her employer had mistakenly believed that
she was engaged in union activity.22 The first reason, which was sufficient to find a violation, is the one that is central to this inquiry.
The Board could not find that the employees had explicitly agreed
to act concertedly. It did find, however, that they had tacitly agreed to
take the new lunch hour issue up with management.22 Accordingly,
the Board found on the authority of Meyers II that the employees had
been engaged in a concerted effort to change the lunch policy and that
Resnick's individual complaints had been a part of that concerted effort.
No formal concertedness was required. Her independent call to the La22 Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Apr. 21, 1987). Switchboard
operators were unionized, reservation clerks were not. Because Resnick had adamantly
objected to becoming affiliated with any union, the company accommodated her when
she was hired by assigning her to a combination reservation-clerk/switchboard-operator
job in which she would work more hours as a reservation clerk, and thus not be included in the union bargaining unit that covered switchboard operators. Considering
Resnick's disdain for unions, what eventually happened to her job was ironic.
26 Id. at 3 (quoting office manager's testimony).
227
228

229

Id.
See id. at 2 (adopting finding of ALJ).
See id. at 6.
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bor Department was deemed a continuation of the implied concerted
activity. Resnick had indeed acted for her fellow employees' mutual aid
and protection.23 0
It is not surprising that Chairman Dotson again dissented, for the
case was much like Every Woman's Place. But in Salisbury Hotel the
majority more clearly articulated its reasoning, pointing out that although there was "no evidence that the . . . employees explicitly
agreed to act together to change the Respondent's lunch hour policy,
they did at least tacitly agree that they had a grievance and that they
should take it up with management." ' ' The Board thus made it clear
that the Meyers rule no longer required literal concertedness. It noted
that it was sufficient that there be only a communication from speaker
(Resnick) to listener (other employees), for "such activity is an indispensible preliminary step to employee self-organization."2 32 The Board
also relied on the fact that the "employees complained among themselves and most, including Resnick, brought the complaint directly to
[management].1 233 It found that "Resnick's complaints to other employees, as well as her individual complaints to [management], were
part of that concerted effort." 234
It was in this case that Member Johansen began to separate himself from his colleagues' still rigid requirement of overt concertedness,
albeit concertedness established by presumption, implied evidence, or
perceived intent. He indicated that he would find a discussion between
two or more employees regarding terms and conditions of employment
to be necessarily concerted activity because it is an "indispensable preliminary step to employee self-organization;" thus, he would not have
required "that the discussion otherwise appear calculated to induce or
prepare for group action, or that it otherwise be related to group action,"2'35 the essential elements in the Mushroom Transportation
formulation.2 36
Regardless of the rationale, however, the Board had now established, on the basis of Every Woman's Place and Salisbury Hotel, that
when several employees express a common complaint about their employment, whether expressed individually or as part of an employees'
meeting with supervision, such activity constitutes protected concerted
23

See id. at 7.

231

Id. at 6.

Id. (quoting Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 16 (quoting RootCarlin, Inc. 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314 (1951))).
233 Id. at 6-7.
234 Id. at 7.
231 Id. See infra notes 241-42 & 248-52 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 80-84.
212
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activity for mutual aid or protection. How farreaching the implication
of this conclusion will be depends on (1) how successfully the Board
and other interests will be in disseminating information about this concept of protected activity and (2) how vigorously and expeditiously the
Board will enforce the law of Section 8(a)(1) to make meaningful its
protection of such concerted activity.
In my view, the finding of concerted activity in these two scenarios
was required by the statute, for it was necessary to make meaningful
the protection of the right to engage in concerted activity. There was
thus no call for the exercise of administrative discretion because the
activity itself was inherently concerted. The policy and legislative history behind Section 7 left the Board no room to manuever. Had the
Board dismissed Doran's and Resnick's complaints, it would have been
appropriate for the reviewing Circuit Courts to reverse and require
that the discharged employees be reinstated and made whole.
C.

The Concept of the Right to Engage in Concerted Activity
37

Scenario Number 4: Parke Care

This scenario involves a nursing home employee who was transferred to a different shift and given a reduced work week because she
had spoken to other employees about the termination of a fellow employee. Gwen Herald was a nurse's aide who happened to be present
when a fellow employee, Gail Davis, was given a termination notice. A
few days later some fellow employees asked Herald about Davis, and
she told them that she had been terminated, adding that she thought the
discharge unfair compared to the offenses of some other employees.
Herald said that it was a shame Davis could not hire a lawyer and
fight it. Another aide expressed the opinion that Davis would lose such
a legal fight to the nursing home's wealthy owner. Herald agreed but
said she hoped Davis would at least be able to receive unemployment
compensation. That conversation took place in the front nursing station;
other conversations about Davis took place in the lobby or, according to
Herald, "wherever someone asked me." 2" 8
The Administrative Law Judge found that Herald's transfer and
the reduction of her work week were due to her conduct with respect to
the termination of Davis. He concluded, however, that Herald's conversation about Davis' termination did not constitute concerted activity
under Meyers I. Relying on the Mushroom Transportationformula2
238

Parke Care of Finneytown, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Dec. 16, 1987).
Id. at 3 app.
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tion, the Board panel majority of Chairman Dotson and Member Babson agreed both with the ALJ's finding and his conclusion, because
"there was no evidence that Herald or any of the employees with
whom she had discussed Davis' discharge, contemplated doing anything
about the discharge."29 Wholly misconceiving the requirement of the
statute, the opinion treated as significant the fact that there was "not
even the suggestion that the employees might attempt to give mutual
aid or protection to Davis by encouraging her to institute legal action to
challenge her termination."2 " In the words of dissenting Member Johansen, the majority had concluded that "Herald's statements were not
protected because no group action was intended, contemplated, or referred to." 2 1 Such a structured concept of mutual aid is not required
by either the language of the statute or its policy. But what the majority failed to recognize their dissenting colleague saw clearly: that the
employees' concerted action for mutual aid or protection did not need to
include any action involving the terminated employee, Davis.
Member Johansen perceptively observed that the ALJ and the
Board panel majority had missed the point, for "[w]hatever Herald was
intending, contemplating, or referring to, she was engaged in actual
concerted activity when she spoke with her fellow employees on [the
day in question]. 24 2 In Johansen's view, a conversation between employees about a fellow employee's dismissal constitutes actual concerted
action. The majority unrealistically conditioned protection of Herald on
some contemplation of overt concerted action.2 43 But at such an amorphous stage of pre-organizational activity, an employee may not know
what she wants or intends to do. It is certainly anomalous for the
Board to tell her that her job will be protected if she openly asserts
herself regarding her concerted activity, but not if she remains quiescent. Such advice undercuts the protection which Congress intended.2 44
Although Herald's motive should not be an issue, the possible reasons she and her fellow employees engaged in the conversations are
relevant to the broad purpose of the Section 7 right. She and her fellow
employees may have been concerned not only about the perceived injustice of Davis' discharge, but also about the problem of job security for
themselves. Indeed, misery does love company. Although their conversation was in itself concerted action, it could also have been the begin239

Id. at 4.

241

Id.
Id. at 8 (Johansen, dissenting).
Id. (Johansen, dissenting).
See id. at 4.

244

See supra notes 129-30 & 137-39 and accompanying text.

240

241
242
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ning of further and more effective concerted action. Thus, it was entitled to the highest protection; for if an employer can nip such
preliminary activity in the bud by eliminating or silencing vocal employee leaders like Herald before real organization occurs, it may never
have to face organized activity among any of its employees.
Scenario Number 5: Adelphi Institute2 45
This scenario involves an employee who was fired for discussing
with another employee the fact that she had been placed on probation.
Karen St. John Black had been employed by a trade school to locate
and enroll students. When she failed to enroll a sufficient number of
students to meet her admissions quota she was placed on probation and
given a letter explaining the probation. Her reaction was not unusual.
She simply went to another employee, Sylvester Humbert, and asked
him if he had ever been on probation. He replied that he had not.
Humbert then called the school director and told him about Black's
inquiry. Whereupon, the director fired Black because, as he testified at
the Board hearing, her discussion with the other employee was "the
straw that broke the camel's back."'2 46
The Board panel majority of Chairman Stephens and Member
Babson agreed with the ALJ's finding that Black's inquiry of Humbert
was the motivating factor for her discharge, but the discharge was not
deemed unlawful because her motive in that conversation had been
purely personal. The opinion stated that there was no evidence "that
Black's concern over her probation was directed toward group action,"
hence the conversation was not considered concerted activity within the
meaning of Mushroom Transportationor Meyers. 4"
Member Johansen again dissented. He would have found that
Black "was engaged in actual concerted activity when she spoke to
Humbert" about her probation.24 " Similar to his approach in Parke
Care, Johansen accused the majority of missing the point when they
asserted that nothing in Black's conduct suggested that she was contem'
plating action "with or on behalf of any other employee." 249
Relying on
2
Root-Carlin,"O Johansen insisted that "[a] conversation between employees is concerted activity . . . even though it involves only a speaker
and a listener. . . . [and] it can scarcely be doubted that Black was
24.Adelphi

Inst., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (Jan. 19, 1988).

246

Id.

241

See id. at 2-3.

Id. at 8 (Johansen, dissenting).
Id. (Johansen, dissenting) (quoting majority opinion).
20 Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951).
24
249
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seeking the aid of Humbert at least in determining the impact of probation."2'5 Johansen may have been right, but the majority countered that
it was an "unfounded assumption that there could be just one purpose
'
for Black's inquiry." 252
I would agree with Johansen's conclusion that Black's conversation was entitled to protection, but I would arrive at that result by a
different route. The purpose of Black's inquiry should have been irrelevant. She was obviously deeply concerned about being placed on probation. She was discharged for discussing the matter with a fellow employee. It should have been sufficient that the probation was the subject
of the discussion; the finding of concertedness, or the right to engage in
concerted conduct, surely cannot be based on the employee's own perception of purpose. An employee may have no clear perception of her
intent when she first engages in a discussion with a fellow employee
about a condition of employment. Clear intent may not develop until
after that discussion, or it may never develop. Nor should it be the
function of the Board to find her intent, whether a "personal" one as
the majority found, or a "concerted" one as the dissent found. If
"equality" between employee and employer means anything at all at
the pre-organizational stage of Section 7, it means that employees cannot be prohibited from engaging in discussions about their conditions of
employment, unless there is a showing of legitimate businesses
2 53
justification.
In Adeiphi, the employee was unsuccessful in her effort to find a
sympathetic response from Humbert, so there was never a ripening of
concerted activity, as there had been in Parke Care. Nevertheless,
Black's effort should have been protected not because it was in itself
concerted but because she was attempting to initiate concerted activity-even though it might have been only of the misery-loves-company
type. To permit the employer to discharge her for such an attempt, as
the Board did, effectively denied her the "right" to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection. Indeed, her conversation was of
the type through which effective concerted action begins; it was therefore entitled to the greatest measure of protection. And because such a
right is so basic to the essence of the intent behind Section 7, there is
no room for the exercise of administrative discretion.25 4
This is not to say, however, that the employer can never limit conversations such as those in which Gwen Herald engaged. But such lim251

252
253

254

Adelphi, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip op. at 8-9 (Johansen, dissenting).
Id. at 4.
See supra notes 114-26, 151 & 162-63 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 150.
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itations must meet the test of legitimate justification, such as the promulgation of a clearly stated rule limiting extensive non-work related
conversations to non-working time, similar to the time and place limitations that may be placed on union solicitation.2 55 But the burden would
be on the employer to establish such a justification.2 56
The majority misjudged its statutory responsibility when it tried to
fit the conversation at issue within the narrow confines of Mushroom
Transportation:that it "must appear . . . that [the conversation] was
engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for
group action. 2 7 It was also irrelevant for them to observe that subject
matter alone, which here was related directly to Black's employment,
was not enough to find concert. The majority failed to come to grips
with the underlying problem, which, as it was perceived by the Court
in Washington Aluminum,2 58 is that in dealing with unorganized employees, the Board should not interpret and apply the statute in a "restricted fashion" that "would only tend to frustrate the policy of the
2 59
Act."
D.
1.

The Weingarten Rule in the Nonunion Workplace
The Weingarten Rule, Materials Research, and Sears

The final scenario raises the proposition of whether Weingarten2
rights apply in workplaces where there is no collective bargaining representation. Before considering that scenario, which is derived from the
DuPont cases,261 some background regarding the Weingarten rule and
its fate in the hands of the NLRB is in order: The Supreme Court
defined the Weingarten right, applicable to unionized workplaces, as
'51See supra notes 114-26, 157 & 162-63 and accompanying text; see also NLRB
v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1979) (applying the principles of Beth
Israel and Republic Aviation to uphold the NLRB's presumptive invalidation of the
hospital's prohibition against union solicitation in non-work areas); Beth Israel Hosp.
v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1978) (holding that restrictions on employee solicitation during nonworking time presumptively violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless
employer offers evidence sufficient to show the rules are necessary to maintain discipline or production).
268 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
267 Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
28 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
269 Adelphi, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip op. at 14.
260 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
281 See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (June 30, 1988)
[DuPont III]; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1985) [DuPont II], rev'd and remanded sub nom. Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.
1986); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1982) [DuPont I]. Companion cases include E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir.
1984); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1983).
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follows:
First, the right inheres in §7's guarantee of the right of
employees to act in concert for mutual aid and
protection ...
Second, the right arises only in situations where the
employee requests representation. .

.

. [T]he employee may

forgo his guaranteed right and, if he prefers, participate in
an interview unaccompanied by his union representative.
Third, the employee's right to request representation as
a condition of participation in an interview is limited to situations where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action ...
Fourth, exercise of the right may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. The employer has no obligation to justify his refusal to allow union representation, and
despite refusal, the employer is free to carry on his inquiry
without interviewing the employee, and thus leave to the employee the choice between having an interview unaccompanied by his representative, or having no interview and foregoing any benefits that might be derived from one. ...
Fifth, the employer has no duty to bargain with any
union representative who may be permitted to attend the investigatory interview.2" 2
The Court explained that "[t]he employer has no duty to bargain with
the union representative at an investigatory interview," 2 3 because the
representative is there only to assist the employee, for example to attempt "to clarify the facts or suggest other employees who may have
knowledge of them. 26 4 The Court declared the right, which the Board
had defined, was a "permissible construction of 'concerted activities for
. . . mutual aid or protection'" and spelled out that the action of an
employee in seeking such assistance clearly falls within the literal
wording of the foregoing statutory phrase "even though the employee
alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome [because] he seeks
'aid or protection' against a perceived threat to his employment security."'26 5 The opinion also reaffirmed the expression of Congressional

intent by noting that to require "a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he reasonably believes may result in the imposi262

Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256-59.

264

Id. at 260.
Id.

265

Id.

263
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tion of discipline perpetuates the inequality the act was designed to
eliminate .

.26
".

In 1982, in MaterialsResearch Corp.,267 the Board introduced the
Weingarten rule into the unorganized workplace. The majority opinion
stated that the rule also applied to unorganized employees because the
Court in Weingarten had "emphasized that the right to representation
is derived from the Section 7 protection afforded to concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection, not from a union's right pursuant to Section 9 to act as an employee's exclusive representative for the purpose
of collective bargaining. "268 The Board explained that a request for the
assistance of a fellow employee, like the comparable request in Weingarten for the assistance of a union steward, is "concerted activity-in
its most basic and obvious form-since employees are seeking to act
together. .

.

.for mutual aid or protection. ' 269 The opinion noted that

the attending co-worker, like the representative in a unionized workplace, could assist the interviewed employee by eliciting favorable facts
or helping to get to the bottom of the problem, for the single employee
"may be too fearful or inarticulate to describe accurately the incident
being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors." ' Furthermore, "a coworker who has witnessed employer action and can accurately inform co-employees may diminish any tendency by an em271
ployer to act unjustly or arbitrarily.

Notwithstanding its pertinent comparative observations, the
MaterialsResearch majority committed the same error that the Reagan
Board would commit in Meyers I and would commit again in Sears,
Roebuck and Co. 272 It held that its construction was compelled by the

statute.2 " And the Material Research Board compounded that error by
concluding that "the right enunciated in Weingarten applie[d] equally
to represented and unrepresented employees.

' 274

As will be explained

later, the right cannot be the same for represented and unrepresented
employees and it need not apply equally.
In 1985, in the Sears case, Reagan Board I reversed Materials
Research. According to the Sears majority, its holding was also an in266
267

Id. at 262.
262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).

268
26

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1015.

270

Id.

271

Id.

272

274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).

"[Tlhe rationale enunciated in Weingarten compels the conclusion that unrepresented employees are entitled to the presence of a coworker at an investigatory interview." MaterialsResearch, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1014 (emphasis added).
274 Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
273
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terpretation that "the Act compels. 275 The opinion viewed Weingarten
as dependent on its union setting because the Court had emphasized the
union representative's "full collective-bargaining authority."2'76 The
Board concluded that "to place a Weingarten representative in a nonunion setting is to require the employer to recognize and deal with the
equivalent of a union representative, contrary to the Act's exclusivity
principle."2 7 Harboring such an inaccurate view of the scope and
scheme of the statute, it is not surprising that the Board-Reagan
Board I- failed to recognize the function of Section 7 rights at the
pre-organizational stage. Its myopic view of the Weingarten rule was
perhaps best illustrated by the following statement in the opinion:
When no union is present

. . .

the imposition of Wein-

garten rights upon employee interviews wreaks havoc with
fundamental provisions of the Act. This is so because the
converse of the rule that forbids individual dealing when a
union is present is the rule that, when no union is present,
an employer is entirely free to deal with its employees on an
individual, group or wholesale basis. .

.

. [Tihe Material

Research Corp. majority said that, with respect to disciplinary action, the nonunion employer cannot deal with an employee on an individual basis; it must deal on a collective
basis.27
That view misconceived both the nature of Section 7 rights at the
pre-organizational stage and the difference between an employer's Section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain with an exclusive and majority union representative and its leeway to deal with groups of employees in concert
where there is no majority union representative.2 79 Although an employer has a duty to bargain with the majority representative of its
employees, where one properly exists, 8 0 it has no duty to deal with a
group of employees;2 " but, in the absence of a majority representative,
275 Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 230 n.5. Concurring Member Hunter, however,
viewed the holding as a permissible but not a mandatory construction. See id. at 233
(Hunter, concurring).
278 Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
277
278

Id. at 232.
Id. at 231.

279 See Finkin, Labor Law by Boz-A Theory of Meyers Industries, Inc., Sears,
Roebuck and Co., and Bird Engineering, 71 IOWA L. REv. 155, 178-188 (1985).
280 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1982).
281 See Charleston Nursing Center, 257 N.L.R.B. 554, 555 (1981) (holding that
an employer has no duty to meet with unrepresented employees despite the fact they
are engaged in protected concerted activity); see also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). There the Court, explaining the
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it may choose, as a matter of discretion or pragmatism, to deal with or
to treat with employees as a group. Thus, when an employee chooses to
confront the employer about a grievance or matter of discipline as one
person in a group rather than as an individual, the employer can make
a choice: either to forego dealing with that employee in direct verbal
exchange or to proceed to deal with her as part of her group, even
though such group may be limited to -the single target employee28 2 and
one fellow employee who has come along to witness the exchange and
thereby provide "mutual aid or protection." This is the "right" to engage in concerted activity for "mutual aid or protection" that is guaranteed by Section 7. In the absence of a legitimate reason to bar or limit
such right, the employee cannot be denied employment or an emolument of employment on account of her participation in that expression
of concerted action, for such a response by the employer would "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" the employee in the exercise of a right
guaranteed in Section 7.2"3
This is not unlike the situation in a unionized environment under
Weingarten, precisely because the procedure is governed by Section 7
rather than by Section 8(a)(5).2" 4 When an employee requests union
representation at such an investigational interview, the employer is not
required to grant the request or to deal with the union representative at
the interview. The Court's opinion recognized that the employer has a
choice: If the employee insists on representation, the employer may dispense with the interview. It is only when the employee has exercised
her right to demand the presence of a union representative and the
employer insists on the interview that the employer must now deal with
the union representative, i.e., deal with the employee as part of a
group.2 5 Therefore, even where there is no union an employer is not
entirely free to deal with its employees individually, certainly not when
limited purpose of the first proviso to Section 9(a) of the Act, stated:
The intendment of the proviso is to permit employees to present grievances
and to authorize the employer to entertain them without opening itself to
liability for dealing directly with employees in derogation of the duty to
bargain only with the exclusive bargaining representative, a violation of
§ 8(a)(5). The Act nowhere protects this "right" by making it an unfair
labor practicefor an employer to refuse to entertain such a presentation
Id. at 61 n.12 (emphasis added).
282 Such as the employee in DuPont III. See infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
28 See Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1962); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)

(1982).

28
285

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258-59.
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they choose to confront their employer concertedly.
As noted throughout this Article, the Act recognizes many stages
of employee organization,"' but it is only a late stage, the establishment of a union majority in an appropriate bargaining unit, that triggers the employer's mandatory duty to deal with the union on an exclusive and collective basis. Under Materials Research, as would also be
the case under Weingarten, the employee would have the choice
whether to confront the employer individually or in concert.
I have discussed the Sears holding in some detail for two reasons:
first, to illustrate the intimate relationship between Weingarten rights
and basic Section 7 rights; and second, to call attention to the Board's
rationale therein, with all of its patently erroneous legal conclusions,
because the current Dupont Board has never disavowed that rationale.
In reaffirming Sears in Dupont III, though on different grounds, Reagan Board II did not reject the Sears rationale; it only overruled the
"finding" in Sears that "the Act compels a finding that unrepresented
employees are not entitled to the presence of a fellow employee during
an investigatory interview. ' 81 7 More significantly, Dupont III reflects
essentially the same attitudes as Sears.
2 The Weingarten Rule and DuPont
Scenario Number 6: DuPont de Nemours & Co.2"'
This scenario involves Walter Slaughter, an employee of the DuPont company, who had posted a notice on an employees' bulletin
board without company permission. Ironically, the notice was an
NLRB poster explaining the basic rights of employees under the National Labor Relations Act. His supervisor saw him post it and asked
him to remove it because it had not been approved in accordance with
company policy. Slaughter refused. The supervisor contacted him on
several occasions to discuss the incident. On each occasion Slaughter
stated that he would not discuss the matter without a coworker present;
he said he would come to the office only if a fellow employee could act
See supra text accompanying note 62.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 5 n.8 (June
30, 1988) [Dupont III] (emphasis added).
288 Dupont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (June 30, 1988). see Slaughter v. NLRB,
794 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986), remanding E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 274
N.L.R.B. 1104 (1985) [DuPont II]; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 733
F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 724 F. 2d 1061
(3d Cir. 1983); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1982)
[DuPont I].
288
287
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as a witness. The supervisor denied each request.'8 9 Slaughter eventually brought a coworker with him to the office, but the supervisor refused to enter into any discussion while the coworker was present.
Slaughter then arranged for another employee to accompany him. This
time the supervisor gave Slaughter an ultimatum, his "last opportunity" to discuss the matter, but without a coworker present, telling him
that his job was now in jeopardy. Finally Slaughter met with the supervisor alone, and shortly thereafter he was discharged.2 90 In DuPont III, the Board made two critical findings: that Slaughter had
"solicited two employees who agreed to act as witnesses for him," and
that he "was discharged solely for his refusal to meet with Respondent
to discuss the posting incident unless a coemployee was present to serve
as a witness."29' 1
Dupont I, following MaterialsResearch, held that Slaughter had
a right under Section 7 to insist upon the presence of a fellow employee during the interview and therefore ordered Slaughter reinstated
with back pay. 92 A panel majority of the Third Circuit sustained the
Board's interpretation of Section 7, enforced the Board order in Dupont I, and indicated approval of Materials Research.2 93 By then,
however, because the Board's membership had changed-it was now
Reagan Board I-the Board requested that the court's opinion be vacated and the case remanded because it was contemplating reconsideration of the Materials Research rule. The Third Circuit complied. Soon
thereafter the Board decided the Sears case.29 4 It then issued Dupont II, finding that Walter Slaughter had not been engaged in protected concerted conduct, thus his discharge was upheld.
When the Third Circuit again reviewed Dupont,2 95 it again reversed the Board and again remanded the case. The reasons for remanding were similar to the remand of Meyers I by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals.2 96 The court rejected the Board's view that
the Act "compels the conclusion"2 7 that nonunion employees do not
See DuPont, 724 F.2d at 1063.
See id. at 1063-64.
DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 4.
See Dupont I, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1029.
It concluded "that the logic and reasoning of Weingarten carry equal force in
the non-union context," DuPont, 724 F.2d at 1065, although Judge Adams perceptively noted his reservations "about the wisdom of applying Weingarten principles to a
non-union setting in the same way they have been applied in a union setting." Id. at
1065 n.5.
29 See supra notes 272-87 and accompanying text (discussing Sears).
295 See Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
298 See supra text accompanying text 192.
297 Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 122 (emphasis omitted).
289
290
291
292
292
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enjoy Weingarten rights, noting that it had previously indicated in its
review of Dupont I that the contrary position in Materials Research
represented a permissible interpretation of the Act.. Citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,29 the court said that it could sustain the Board only if "no
other interpretation of the Act is permissible, regardless of whether
their order could be sustained on other grounds." 29
The Board retained the remanded case for exactly two years.
When it finally issued Dupont III, the Board (now Reagan Board II)
reaffirmed its rejection of the Materials Research rule, holding that
"an employee in a non-unionized workplace does not possess a right
under Section 7 to insist on the presence of a fellow employee in an
investigatory interview by the employer's representatives, even if the
employee reasonably believes that the interview may lead to
discipline."3'0
This latest opinion in DuPontis curious for many reasons, not the
least of which is that it wholly ignores the rule that the Board had so
recently promulgated with much fanfare in the Meyers cases, even the
non-controversial part of that rule that guaranteed that an employee's
activity would be deemed concerted if it was "engaged in with . . .
other employees." 301 Notwithstanding the obvious fit between that language and the specific facts of DuPont, and notwithstanding that the
Board has never denied that when Slaughter obtained the agreement of
a fellow employee (in fact two employees) to be present during the investigatory interview that such arrangement constituted concerted activity, the opinion in DuPont III made no reference to the "with . . .
other employees" part of the Meyers rule, or any other part of that
rule. In fact, it never mentioned or even cited Meyers except with an
ambiguous "cf." signal in the opinion's final paragraph as ostensible
support for an unrelated conclusion.3" 2 How could this be? How could
the Board decide a case involving alleged Section 7 activity of nonunion
employees without relying on the very rule that it had so recently
promulgated to cover such conduct? I have no legally satisfactory answer to that question. However, apart from its deficiency as a matter of
law, it is not hard to fathom the Board's reasoning. The Board simply
chose to decide the case on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in
218
299

300

318 U.S. 80 (1943) [Chenery I].
Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 122.
DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 5. The Board overruled its

finding in Sears that the Act compels that interpretation. See id. at 5 n.8.
30. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497; see supra notes 187-88 and accompanying
text.
302 That it could best effectuate the purpose of the Act by limiting the right of
representation in investigatory interviews to employees in unionized workplaces.
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Weingarten rather than on the basis of the requirements of Section 7.
The entire opinion in DuPont III was devoted to an attempt to
demonstrate that the Court in Weingarten had not intended that case to
cover the nonunion workplace. Thus, at the conclusion of DuPont III,
the Board stated with obvious relief that it believed "its conclusion to be
fully consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten."'
In the Board's view, the Court's discourse and framework "presuppose
union representation" 30 4 and the "separate factors on which the Court
rested its decision translate poorly into a case involving a nonunion
workplace." 305 The court in Weingarten was certainly writing primarily for the unionized workplace, given the facts of the case. Consequently, except for statements relating to legislative history and the
general scope of Section 7 language, it was not writing about the requirements of Section 7 vis-A.-vis unorganized employees. Weingarten
was important to the Dupont facts, but not in the manner in which the
Board chose to use it.
The Board in DuPont Ill simply asked the wrong questions.
It should have addressed (1) whether Section 7 required the DuPont
supervisor to deal with Slaughter in the presence of one of his coworkers who had previously agreed to join with him at the investigatory
interview and (2) whether that supervisor could insist, as a condition of
Slaughter's continued employment, that Slaughter abandon his effort to
appear concertedly rather than individually to discuss the work-related
problem for which he was to be interviewed. DuPont III is curious
indeed, for it failed to apply the "linkage" concept that the Board had
expounded in Meyers II, although Reagan Board I had discussed and
rejected the same concept in Dupont 11.306 Under Reagan Board II's
new reading of "linkage," 3 0 7 a finding of concertedness would have
been inevitable.30 8
For reasons explicated in the general theory formulation, it should
be apparent that the foregoing two questions concern the mandatory
requirements of the statute. And it should be evident that the answer to
the first question is clearly "yes." The answer to the second question is
303

304

DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 12.

Id.

305 Id.

'0' See DuPont II, 274 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1104 n.7 (1985), rev'd sub nom. Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). There, the Board stated: "Because there is
no linkage between Slaughter's solicitation of employee witnesses and the cause of his
discharge, we find Meyers inapplicable herein." Id.
307 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
308 See Salisbury Hotel, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101. slip. op. at 6-7; Every Woman's
Place, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 48, slip op. at 2; Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No.
24, slip op. at 6-7 (Nov. 13, 1986).
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either "no" or a qualified "no." The qualification derives from a third.
question which the Board might ask: Did the employer present any
evidence of facts or circumstances that would justify denying or limiting
Slaughter's right to appear with a coworker (his right to pursue concerted activity) as he had requested? Or, in the alternative, the Board
might ask, for purposes of broad rulemaking without reference to adjudicatory burden-of-proof considerations: Is there any rationally based
justification for employers in general to deny or limit the right of their
employees to appear concertedly rather than individually at such investigatory interviews? I cannot conceive of any justification, consistent
with Section 7, for an absolute denial of such a right. Reasonable limitations on the right, however, such as might be required to avoid undue
interference with production, would certainly be appropriate. But if the
Board were to answer the third question in the affirmative, and thus
indicate that a legitimate justification exists (for a limitation, not a denial), then it would still be obligated to provide an explanation for that
conclusion consistent with statutory policy. DuPont III, by any reading, neither asked nor properly answered those questions. And such
questions are raised by the basic thrust of the statute.
The Board did, however, suggest an answer to the last question,
although without asking it explicitly or implicitly, and without explaining its answer. Its explication consisted solely of the conclusionary
statement that it had "tak[en] into account the nonunion employers'
interests in conducting investigations in accordance with their own established practices and procedures and in maintaining efficiency of operation." 30 9 That conclusion, about which I shall comment shortly, was
unsupported by any evidence, empirical data, or explanatory discussion.
Returning to the first two questions posed: At the very least their
answers yield a minimum statutory rule, a rule as to which no room
exists for the exercise of administrative discretion because fundamental
Section 7 rights are at issue. This basic rule, which emerges from the
DuPont facts, may be stated as follows:
An employee in a nonunion workplace who is called in by
the employer's representative for an investigatory interview
which the employee reasonably believes may lead to discipline has a right under Section 7 to insist on the presence at
that interview of a coworker who has agreed to be present.
309 DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 12. The reference to "employers'" interests, rather than to "the employer's," was another indication that the Board
was consciously writing a rule of broad application, not merely adjudicating the DuPont case.
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As I have suggested, such a rule would be subject to reasonable
time and place limitations based upon the employer's legitimate business needs. Furthermore, as under the Weingarten doctrine,"' 0 the employer in the nonunion workplace would not be compelled to conduct
the interview if the employee demands the presence of the coworker
(assuming one had agreed to present); but if the employer insists on the
interview, it must allow the coworker to be present. Likewise, the
targeted employee may be required to choose either to appear alone at
the interview or to forego the opportunity to present his defensive statement to the employer. Thus, when the employer insists on interrogating
the employer about a matter affecting working conditions-indeed in
DuPont the employee's job was at stake-the rule would guarantee the
employee the right to confront the employer concertedly rather than
individually. But such a right could be exercised only if the employee
has a coworker who is willing to be present and thereby provide the
mutual aid or protection of which the statute speaks. This minimum
rule, with the limitations noted, is patently mandated by the statute.
Slaughter was entitled to no less.
Beyond this basic rule the Board, in the application of its administrative discretion, could fashion a rule broader than the foregoing minimal statutory standard-one that could be easily understood and applied and one that would further implement statutory policy.3 1 Such a
rule would follow naturally in the long-standing tradition of other
NLRB rules that define and regulate various forms of employer interference with the exercise of Section 7 rights.3 1 2 Many variations of
such a discretionary rule governing investigatory interviews in unorganized workplaces would be feasible. But the most obvious variation
would be a rule similar to that in Weingarten, but tailored more specifically to conditions in the nonunion workplace. Such a rule might require that when an employer insists upon interviewing an employee
about a matter that the employee reasonably believes could lead to dis310 See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 259 (stating that "the employer is free to carry on
his inquiry without interviewing the employee, and thus leave to the employee the
choice between having an interview unaccompanied by his representative, or having no
interview and foregoing any benefits that might be derived from one").
...Materials Research almost, but never quite, articulated such a rule.
12 Two examples are (1) rules limiting employer restrictions on union solicitation
at the workplace, see Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943), quoted in
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945); Jeannette Corp. v.
NLRB, 532 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1976); C. MORRIS, supra note 70, at 88-107; id. Supp.
at 19-27; supra text accompanying notes 116-20, and (2) rules defining union access to
private property, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Sept. 27, 1988),
overruling Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (Nov. 13, 1986).
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cipline, and the employee requests the presence of a coworker at such
interview, the employer must provide the employee with a reasonable
opportunity to seek out such a coworker before the interview may proceed. But if, after being given such opportunity, the employee is unable
to produce an agreeable coworker, then the employer would be free to
proceed with the interview and thus deal with the employee individually rather than collectively.
This limitation would be different from the Weingarten rule. In a
unionized workplace a union steward, or the equivalent, will usually be
available to appear with the interviewed employee. Because of the institutionalized presence of a union, it is not unreasonable to require the
employer in a collective bargaining environment to condition the interview on the presence of a union representative, which is what the
Weingarten rule requires. But in a nonunion setting, where there will
normally not be a permanent presence of an employee group, the employer will have no similar reason to refrain from interviewing the employee alone if the employee is unable to produce a coworker willing to
be present during the interview.
When an employee has approached one or more other employees
seeking such mutual aid or protection (whether on the employee's own
initiative or in response to an opportunity provided by the employer)
but has failed to convince at least one coworker to provide the desired
standby assistance, there is no concerted action. The employee may
have exercised a "right" to engage in concerted activity by requesting
the presence of a fellow employee at the interview-a right DuPont III
concedes is protected;3"' but if the exercise of that right has not
achieved the concerted action which was sought, then the employer
should not be further obligated to alter its conduct of the interview.
The statute does not guarantee employees the existence of concerted
action, only the right to engage in it. This is a distinction that Materials Research failed to appreciate when it uncritically held that the
Weingarten rule applied "equally to represented and unrepresented
"I1See DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 18 n.15. The concession
appears grudging, because it is buried in the penultimate footnote in a double negative
statement:
Our finding. . . should not be read as implying that an employee enjoys
no protected right to ask for the presence of a fellow employee at such an
interview. The mere act of making such a request in no way impairs the
employer interests involved here and thus we would not need to strike the
balance as we have done . ...
Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the concession represents a valid legal conclusion.
It is strange indeed that the Board would protect the employee's right to request the
presence of a coworker, but not protect the employee from the consequences of that
request.
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employees."314
Because DuPont III focused primarily on the text of Weingarten
rather than on the text of Section 7, it failed to come to grips with the
basic statutory issues posed by Slaughter's conduct. The Board ignored
the implications of its own finding of concertedness-that Slaughter
had "solicited two employees who agreed to act as witnesses for
him." '15 And it never discussed the Section 7 implications of Slaughter's undisputed attempt, together with one of those employees, to confront his supervisor concertedly during the disciplinary interview,
which was unmistakably group action. Even as interpreted by the Meyers formulation, the statute protected such concerted activity. Accordingly, it was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) for the employer to discharge
Slaughter for insisting that a coworker be permitted to appear with him
at the interview.
Although the employer could not lawfully terminate Slaughter because of his concerted activity, the supervisor was not required to meet
with him and his coworker together, for Section 8(a)(1) does not mandate that the employer deal with a concerted group.316 This is unlike
the requirement of Section 8(a)(5), which does mandate dealing with a
union when it is the majority representative of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit. But under Section 8(a)(1), in the unorganized workplace, the choice is the employer's to deal or not to deal
with the group. It is not an unlimited choice. For, as we have seen in
Weingarten, if the employer's representative insists on the investigatory
interview, as did Slaughter's supervisor, he will be required to treat the
targeted employee concertedly. Just as in Weingarten-for this is an
aspect of Weingarten grounded in basic Section 7 protection-in the
unorganized workplace both the employer and the employee, assuming
the existence of a willing coworker witness, have a similar choice. The
choice that the Court recognized in the Weingarten formulation would
thus also be applicable in the nonunion workplace: "[Tihe employer is
free to carry on his inquiry without interviewing the employee, and
thus leave to the employee the choice between having an interview...
and foregoing any benefit that might be derived from one." ' But beMaterials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1010 (emphasis added).
DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 3.
3"8 See supra note 281.
317 Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258; see id. at 258-59 ("The employer may, if it
wishes, advise the employee that it will not proceed with the interview unless the employee is willing to enter the interview unaccompanied by his representative. The employee may then refrain from participating in the interview, thereby protecting his right
to representation, but at the same time relinquishing any benefit which might be derived from the interview. The employer would then be free to act on the basis of infor""
315
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cause Slaughter's supervisor insisted on conducting the interview with
Slaughter alone, Slaughter's Section 7 rights were violated.
In evaluating the Board's decision in DuPont III not to extend
Weingarten rights to nonunion employees, it must be emphasized that
the Board had previously extended such rights through the rule announced in Materials Research;3 18 therefore Sears and DuPont represent a recision of an existing rule,3 19 and DuPont III represents the
Board's amended version of its reasons for abandoning that rule.
The Board faces the same constraints on its freedom to rescind an
existing rule as any other federal administrative agency 20 It must provide an adequate explanation for its action, 321 and must clearly demonstrate the rationality of the action. This clarity requirement is of paramount importance when the Board engages in rulemaking, regardless
of the procedural mode that it chooses to use for the process. And when
it changes an existing rule, it has a special duty to explain the basis of
its action in order to demonstrate that it has considered appropriate
factors in exercising its discretion.3 22 As the Supreme Court has emmation obtained from other sources.") (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052,
1052 (1972)).
3'8 Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1010.
31'9 The posture of the changed rule is not unlike that which recently faced the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in the FinancialInst. Employees case. which
involved the Board's alteration of a rule covering the certification of a union's new
affiliation. See Financial Inst. Employees of Am., 752 F.2d 352, 360, 364 (9th Cir.
1984) (recognizing its obligation to uphold the Board's new rule "if it is rational and
consistent with the NLRA," but finding the new rule inconsistent with "strong national [labor] policy"), rev'g, 265 N.L.R.B. 426 (1982), aft'd, 475 U.S. 192, (1986)
(affirming the time-honored standard of review that the Board's action would be sustained unless it was "irrational or inconsistent with the Act"); see also Taylor v.
NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the Board's new rule concerning
deferral to arbitration, promulgated in Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), because
the rule conflicted with the Board's own responsibility to protect employee's rights).
320 "[TIhe Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and . . .the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the
first instance within the Board's discretion," NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 294 (1974), but "there may be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act." Id. Although the
choice between those procedures lies with the Board, it still must satisfy minimum
standards generally applicable to any federal administrative agency when it interprets
the statute that it is charge with administering. See supra note 129. Choosing the adjudicatory mode does not relieve the agency of its substantive rulemaking responsibility,
however, as the Board was reminded the hard way regarding the applicability of Chenery I to Meyers and DuPont, the two anchor cases reviewed in the scenarios herein.
See supra notes 192 & 298 and accompanying text.
321 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941) (stating that
"[tihe administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise . . . .All
we ask of the Board is to give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with
which Congress has empowered it").
2I See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) [hereinafter State Farm]; Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United
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phasized, "revocation of an extant regulation is substantially different
than a failure to act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of the agency's
former views as to the proper course." '23 Such explanatory process is
especially critical in cases like DuPont, where the Board's action has
the apparent effect of depriving employees of statutory rights. 24 As the
Supreme Court stressed in State Farm,
Normally an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise. 25
Under these relevant standards, the Board's decision in DuPont III
leaves much to be desired. Its failure to consider such relevant factors as
the impact of its decision on the associational rights of employees ultimately cripples the agency's ability to carry out the will of Congress.
Accordingly, it will be instructive to examine the factors that the Board
did consider.
The Board specifically referred to the language of Section 7 only
once in DuPont IIL In doing so, it virtually conceded that when measured by the statutory language alone, concerted action was involved. It
said that a "literal reading of Section 7 might indeed suggest that it
bestows on nonunion employees the right in question here.

'3 26

But it

refused to apply the plain language of Section 7, preferring what it
States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957); see also USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Secretary of HEW,
466 F.2d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that "findings of fact are not mere procedural niceties; they are essential to the effective review of administrative decisions"). In

State Farm, the Court spelled out with critical precision the rationality standard governing an administrative recision of a rule. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (arguing
that the act of rescission created "'at least a presumption that those policies [which
Congress had intended] will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to . ...
[An agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned
analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not
act in the first instance") (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Rly. v. Wichita Bd.of
Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1973)); id. at 43 (stating that the agency has the respon-

sibility to "examine relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' ") (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
323 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41.
324 My concern with procedure in this analysis is directly related to the substance
of the rule being examined, for the Board's failure to consider all relevant factors appears to have contributed to its arrival at a decision at odds with the intent of the

statute.
325 State Farm,
32'DuPont III,

463 U.S. at 43.
289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 7.
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perceived as a balancing approach, which was unfortunately based on
its misreading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Weingarten. Noting
the Court's comment that the Board in Weingarten had struck "a fair
and reasonable balance between the conflicting interests of labor and
management, 3' 27 the DuPont III Board attempted to do likewise with
the facts of DuPont. But, as demonstrated by the following statement
from the opinion, it was seeking to reconcile the wrong interests in this
nonunion setting:
Taking into account the more questionable value of such a
right in the nonunion setting, we find that the interests of
both labor and management are better served by declining to
extend this right into that forum. In so holding, we also take
into account the nonunion employers' interests in conducting
investigations in accordance with their own established practices and procedures and in maintaining efficiency of
operation.32"
"Labor" in that statement, as indicated both by its context and the
Board's reference to the interests involved in the Weingarten doctrine,
obviously meant organized labor or unions, not unorganized employees.
The statute, however, especially Section 7, is designed primarily for
employees-not employers and not unions. The union interest is certainly important at later stages of Section 7 activity, but at the preorganizational stage the Board's focus should be predominately upon the
rights of employees.3 2 Nor is it appropriate for the Board to "balance"
those rights directly against the employer's rights. A different standard,
or at least the invocation of a balancing standard at a different burdenof-proof stage, should be utilized to determine employer rights when
they conflict with employees rights to engage in concerted activity for
purposes contemplated by Section 7. As I have noted previously,"3 ' any
limitation upon the exercise of such rights is presumptively a violation
of Section 8(a)(1). That presumption may be rebutted, however, by a
showing of the existence of some legitimate justification that requires a
limitation, or in rare cases conceivably even a prohibition, of the con327

Id. at 6.

Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added); supra note 309. In referring to "employer's
interests," the Board had clearly assumed the rulemaking mode, for it certainly was not
referring to DuPont's specific interests, as to which the record was probably silent.
32 See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (indicating that failure to interpret Section 7 liberally "would effectively nullify the right to
engage in concerted activities").
330 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
328
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certed activity in issue. 33 ' Only after it has been demonstrated that the
employer's legitimate need truly conflicts with the employees' Section 7
rights would it be appropriate for the Board to engage directly in a
balancing of interests between the employer and the employees. Oddly,
the Board in DuPont III purported to use Republic Aviation as its
model, noting in that case a balancing of the "employers' interest in
maintaining 'discipline in their establishments' against employees' interests in engaging in activities covered by . . .Section 7,"32 an analogy that Member Cracraft found unwarrented.33 3 Although she did not
indicate the basis for her declining to rely on the analogy to no-solicitation rules, perhaps her reason was the same as one I find to be readily
apparent: The Board and the Supreme Court, as expressed in Peyton
Packing and Republic Aviation, indeed accommodated the competing
interests of employers and employees, but did so based on a presumption that any interference with employee solicitation outside of working
hours, although on company property, represented an "unreasonable
impediment to self-organization""3 " and was therefore unlawful. The
Board in Dupont recognized no comparable presumption, though one
might have been appropriate.
Aside from the inappropriateness of the Board's attempt to balance
the interests of "labor" and "management" in Dupont III, in the end
there was no balancing at all. In fact, the holding of DuPont III would
make it more difficult for employees to develop experience in confronting their employer concertedly, albeit in a mild and non-threatening manner,335 and therefore would also make it less likely that they
would dare to assert themselves in forming a labor organization. And
on the employer's side of the scale, the Board required no showing at
all to justify its yielding to the employer's position. There was no balancing of interests; there was only the Board's bald assertion that it had
balanced interests.
True, the Board did indicate that it was taking into account "the
nonunion employers' interests in conducting investigations in accordance with their own established practices and procedures and in maintaining efficiency of operation." ' But where was the evidence or empirical data to support those conclusions? There was no showing that
331See
332

supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 328.
Dupont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 7 n.9.

Peyton Packing, 49 N.L.R.B. at 843-44, quoted in Republic Aviation, 324
U.S. at 803 n.10.
' See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-68, 574 (1978); text accompanying note 166 (discussing the variable nature of concerted activity).
"I DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 17-18.
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efficiency of operations would be unreasonably impaired if an employee
were permitted to be accompanied by a fellow employee at an investigatory interview. The efficiency factor would likely be the same
whether in a union or a nonunion establishment, and Weingarten readily disposed of that issue by its stated condition that "exercise of the
right may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives."3 37 In
other words, the employer can impose reasonable time and place limitations on the protected interview process. Furthermore, efficiency is no
more a prohibitory factor in this case than in employee solicitation
cases or in union access cases. 338
DuPont III is replete with irrelevant conclusions and non sequiturs. For instance, it assumes that an employee who enlists the support of a fellow employee for appearance at the interview does so only
because of "an implicit promise that the employee enlisting support
would offer his own support were the other facing such an interview." 3 9 That may or may not have been Slaughter's reason, but an
employee's subjective reason in such a situation is wholly irrelevant. °
An employee seeking the presence of a coworker at an investigatory
interview may do so for a variety of reasons. It may be to have a witness present to protect the "record" of what happens, and if necessary
to repeat that record to others, or it may be only to provide the mutual
aid or protection that comes from misery loving company. But whatever
the reason, since the Board was rescinding the Materials Research
rule, at the very least it had an obligation, implicit from the requirements of State Farm,4 1 to address the possible reasons for having the
coworker present which the Board earlier had outlined in Materials
Research. They were the following:
A coworker can assist by eliciting favorable facts and even,
perhaps, save the employer production time by helping to get
to the bottom of the problem that occasioned the interview.
Certainly, that an employee is not part of a represented unit
does not alter the real possibility that a single employee, confronted by an employer investigating conduct which may result in discipline, may be too fearful or inarticulate to describe accurately the incident being investigated, or too
ignorant to raise extenuating factors . . . . Indeed, without
'" Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258.
338 See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 7-8.
340 Just as the reason for the conversation in the Parke Care scenario was irrelevant. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
'll See supra notes 322-25.
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the benefit of a grievance-arbitration procedure to check unjust or arbitrary conduct, an employee in an unorganized
plant may experience even greater apprehension than one in
an organized plant and need the moral support of a sympathetic fellow employee. Moreover, a coworker who has witnessed employer action and can accurately inform co-employees may diminish any tendency by an employer to act
unjustly or arbitrarily. 42
Rather than address those reasons, the Board embarked on another set of non sequiturs, part of its attempt to fit the square peg of
the instant case into the round hole of Weingarten. It marshalled a
number of arguments as to why it believed that the Weingarten rule
would not be beneficial to employees in a nonunion setting, concluding
with the observation that "there is a serious question whether extending the right to nonunion employees may not work as much to
their disadvantage as to their advantage." '4 3 Here the Board was substituting its judgment for that of Congress and the employees. As the
Materials Research Board had accurately observed: "It is for the employee himself to determine whether the presence of a coworker at an
investigatory interview provides some measure of protection.

3

44

If the

process should seem more disadvantageous than advantageous to a particular employee, it must be presumed that such employee would opt
for an individual interview rather than for a concerted interview with a
coworker present. But that is a decision which Congress not only left to
the employees to make, it also guaranteed them the right to make such
a decision for themselves without undue interference from either the
employer or the Board.
Although the Board's reasons for finding a possible disadvantage
to the employee are irrelevant, I shall nevertheless note them in order
to demonstrate such irrelevance, and/or their lack of substance. First,
the Board observed that "in a nonunion setting there is no guarantee
that the interests of the employees as a group would be safeguarded by
the presence of a fellow employee at an investigatory interview. 31

45

It is

not the function of the Board to be concerned about the wisdom of the
group action. Congress left the decision to act in concert or to refrain
from acting in concert to the employees themselves.346 That is the
scheme of the Act. The Board also noted that in a nonunion work force
Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 11.
3, Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
3 DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 12.
346 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
342
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the fellow employee has no obligation to represent the interests of the
entire bargaining unit. 47 Of course not, at least not in any direct way;
but the purpose of the pre-organizational protection of Section 7 is to
allow employees freedom of association-in fact that may be the very
beginning of association.
The Board also made the following three observations: (1) that
"an employee in a nonunion work force would be much less able than a
union representative to 'exercise vigilance' " to prevent the employer
from imposing unjust punishment,348 (2) that such an employee would
be less likely than a union representative "to have access to information
as to how other employees had been dealt with in similar circumstances,"13 4 and (3) that it is unlikely that the nonunion coworker
would possess the same level of skill as a representative in a nonunion
setting."' Remarkable, all three of these observations are reasons the
protected investigatory interview process in a nonunion setting would
provide an excellent training opportunity for nonunion employees to
acquire and improve their organizational skills. These are in fact reasons the rule in question relates directly to the organizational process
that Section 7 sought to foster and protect. The fact that such nonunion
employees presently lack those skills tells us nothing about the skills
which some of them might develop if they have a protected opportunity
to do so.3 51
The Board then advanced another purported reason that revealed
how far removed some its views were from reality. And it did not
choose to remand the case to the Administrative Law Judge for evidence of reality, nor did it seek empirical data on the subject through
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. That additional reason
was contained in the following observation:
It is of course obvious that the value of representation at an
investigatory interview as a means of heading off formal
grievances has virtually no application in the nonunion setting. .. In the nonunion workplace there typically is no
enforceable grievance procedure through which the employee
could seek further recourse ....
52
Although grievance procedures in nonunion establishments may not be
legally enforceable, in many companies there are elaborate procedures
141See DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 12.
348

Id.

349 Id.
350 See id. at 14.
35'

Surely there is a role for a shop "mavin" in every workplace.

112

DuPont III, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 81, slip op. at 15-16.
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in which an organizationally skillful employee might have a meaningful role to play. DuPont III assumes that there are no grievance procedures in nonunion companies, whereas in most large nonunion companies just the opposite is true. 53 Although DuPont is an example of a
large nonunion company, the Board's opinion sheds no light as to what
kind of grievance procedure, if any, might have existed at the place
where Slaughter worked.
The Board in DuPont III, obsessed as it was with Weingarten
rather than with ordinary Section 7 requirements, succeeded only in
obfuscating the Act's purpose. The nonunion investigatory interview
rule at issue may indeed be a square peg that does not fit immediately
into Weingarten's round hole. But there is a peg and there is a hole.
The Board's job is to make them fit. That is not really a difficult assignment. Section 7 provides clear language with which to perform the
task. When one employee agrees to stand by another employee when
the latter is being interrogated about matters that could lead to discipline, concerted activity for mutual aid or protection in its most basic
form is being provided. That is what DuPont was all about.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The general theory outlined in this Article spells out the right of
employees to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection.
It is designed to provide a methodology for interpreting and applying
the language of Section 7, particularly in the nonunion workplace. The
conclusions to be drawn from such a rationalization of this statutory
language are neither obvious nor certain. But if the Board and the
courts were to apply the provision as this Article suggests, which is
asking no more than what Congress has asked through exceedingly
plain language and clear legislative intent, certain developments could
likely follow. How likely, however, will depend primarily on three factors, all of which are largely within the control of the Board. These
factors are (1) recognition of the rights as formulated, (2) effective enforcement of such rights, and (3) effective dissemination of information.
If the rights to engage in protected conduct outlined in this Article are
"I See F. FAULKS, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES 276322 (1980); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, STUDIES IN PERSONNEL
POLICY No. 109, GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN NONUNIONIZED COMPANIES 41-47
(1950); A.W.J. THOMSON, THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
11-13 (1974); Westin, Internal Mechanisms for Resolving Employee Complaints in
Nonunion Organizations, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 13-1 (1986) (Proceedings of the 32nd Southwestern Legal Foundation Labor Law Institute); Policies for
Unorganized Employees, (BNA) PPF Survey No. 125 (Apr. 1979).
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to have a meaningful impact on industrial relations, they must be recognized and enforced vigorously by the Board. But if employees are to
use their rights effectively, and if employers are to comply with the
statutory requirements voluntarily, employees and employers must be
made aware of the Board's rules in this area. The Board has the means
to achieve effective enforcement'" and to bring the necessary information relating to the identity and administration of these rights to the
attention of employers and employees at their workplaces. 35 5 Unfortunately, the Board's record of enforcing the core provisions of the Act
has been less than adequate. 5 ' But hope springs eternal.
In evaluating the conclusions that might be drawn from this general theory, one should not lose sight of the vital nexus that exists between the Act and the language of Section 7 which enunciates the right
of employees to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. I have referred to such activity as pre-organizationalactivity because it is action that Congress clearly intended to protect as activity
precursory to formal union organization. That part of Section 7 was
never intended to be read in isolation. In particular cases, such as in the
six scenarios discussed in this Article, there may be no relevant union
presence. This is often the condition when employees assert their right
of association at an early stage, when they have not formulated any
planned strategy as to how their concerted activity, which is frequently
spontaneous, might be translated into improved working conditions.
Not only is the statutory protection of such preliminary activity
closely connected with the overall statutory policy of "encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining," 57 such protection applies to perhaps the most critical phase in the entire spectrum of organizational activity. That phase, as illustrated by the commonplace conduct on which this Article has focused, concerns actions and expressions
by employees when they are at their most vulnerable stage in the organizational process-when they have no organizational structure, no
union, and usually no knowledge of the law to protect them. Consequently, unless the Board intervenes, an alert employer intent on maintaining a union-free environment can, by preemptive action, effectively
eliminate or silence any employee who dares make a move to assert a
statutory right of association about matters of workplace concern. Although the Board and the courts have not emphasized this strong nexus
between traditional union activity and mutual-aid-or-protection cons" See Morris, supra note 11, at 27-49.
s See id. at 38-41.
s See id. at 17-22.
35
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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certed activity, it is important that such nexus be fully recognized; for
when the Board protects such conduct, it vindicates more than just employment rights of the individual employees involved. It vindicates public rights expressed by the statute.
One saluatory result that might ultimately be derived from the formulation I have proposed, assuming it is properly applied with appropriate enforcement and education, is that the "union fear" factor could
be substantially eliminated or reduced in the American workplace.
Under the Act, employees theoretically have the right to engage in
union activity or to refrain from such activity. But the reality has been
that American employees are usually afraid to express their feelings
about organizational activity, for they fear retaliation within the at-will
employment system under which they work. Recognition of the preorganizational rights outline herein, coupled with adequate enforcement
of those rights, could go a long way toward dispelling this fear factor.
In appraising American industrial relations generally, one should
not lose sight of the fact that the association among employees that the
Act protects does not contemplate association into any particular kind
of labor organization, provided only that the organization not be dominated or supported by the employer. 358 The scheme of the Act allows
for the development of a wide variety of organizational forms and does
not rigidly mandate any particular type of collective bargaining.35 The
Act provides American employees and their employers with broad legal
opportunities to fashion or develop finely tuned instruments of collective bargaining to assist them in improving two important and interdependent aspects of the workplace: employee morale and employee productivity. For such developments, the Act provides the means. The
parties-employers, unions, and employees-must themselves provide
the appropriate bargaining structures and suitable substantive terms
and conditions of employment. The genius of the American system of
collective bargaining is that bargaining structures and terms and conditions of employment can be what the parties mutually want them to be.
Terms and structures can and do differ from workplace to workplace.
Collective bargaining agreements can be tailor-made to suit the eclectic
requirements of a variety of bargaining patterns. Consequently, contrary to much conventional wisdom, the National Labor Relations Act
See id. § 158(a)(2).
'5' But see NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (unnecessarily narrowing the scope of bargaining); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672
(1980) (unnecessarily narrowing the definition of employees who may be covered by
the bargaining); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (unnecessarily
narrowing the process of bargaining).
358
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offers American industry and American workers an ideal framework in
which to organize their relationships, so that they will be able to compete more successfully in the world of the twenty-first century. This is
not to say that the Act cannot be improved by legislation. But any effort
at congressional improvement should relate primarily to enhancing the
Board's efficiency and enforcement capability; it need not change the
basic thrust of the statute.36 0
It is common knowledge that most American employers, being primarily concerned with short-term profit objectives, prefer not to deal
with unions in their establishments. It is not the function of this Article
to debate the merits of either of those microeconomic concerns or objectives. However, when I view the macroindustrial scene, I am compelled
to note the anachronistic manner in which we have organized our
workplaces. Although we live in a politically democratic society, American employment relationships are typically authoritarian and militaristic in structure. Inasmuch as there is no town meeting type democracy
available for most people, the workplace is the one place in which they
could, given the opportunity, exercise a degree of hands-on democratic
participation about matters that greatly affect their lives. Many of
America's successful trading partners, perhaps most notably West Germany, Japan, and Sweden, have apparently been able to achieve high
productivity with a significant amount of employee participation in
workplace decision-making. If American industry is to move in a similar direction, then more employers will need an entity among their employees with whom to communicate and deal. And if workers are truly
involved in shared decisionmaking, which may be essential for high
productivity in the technological workplace of tomorrow, that entity
should belong to them, not to their employer.
These are some of the possible developments that might flow from
increased, but also adequately protected, employee organizational activity on which this Article has focused. Such activity often begins with
only an elementary expression of mutual aid or protection among a
very few employees. If employees begin to know that they have the
right to organize, that they have the right to develop a sense of organization, and that they can experience organization through trial and error-such as by standing by each other in disciplinary interviews, or
discussing with one another common problems of the workplace and
not being afraid to bring them to the attention of management-they
...This is not to say, however, that no changes in substantive law are needed. See
supra note 359. But most such changes can be achieved by normal administrative and
judicial means.
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will indeed have begun to exercise their right of association in the
workplace. This was Senator Wagner's grand vision.

